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ARTICLES
INDIGENIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: CUSTOMARY LAW, LEGAL PLURALISM,





Cultures live and cultures die. Cultures live by the transmission of
law, knowledge, land, and resources from one generation to the next.1
Cultures die, in large measure, because of exploitation of peoples and
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1. Culture can be described as the collective programming of the mind that dis-
tinguishes the members of one group or community from another. Cultural life is
constructed reality. Culture includes values, symbols, beliefs, and shared meanings.
Culture governs what is of value and how members should think, feel, and behave.
The "stuff" of culture includes customs and traditions; historical accounts; stated and
unstated understandings; habits, norms, and expectations; common meanings and
shared assumptions. The more understood, accepted, and cohesive the culture of
community, the better able it is to move in concert toward ideals it holds and objec-
tives it wishes to pursue. See Thomas J. Sergiovanni, Leadership and Excellence in
Schooling, in RETHINKING LEADERSHIP: A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES 5, 11 (2007);
see also Ngfigi wa Thiong'o, DECOLONISING THE MIND: THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE
IN AFRICAN LITERATURE 14 (James Curry/Heinemann 1986) (describing culture as
that which "embodies those moral, ethical and aesthetic values, the set of spiritual
eyeglasses, through which [human beings] come to view themselves and their place in
the universe").
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the knowledge they possess. In reality, cultures are constantly under
attack from politically-oriented societies bent on exterminating, ex-
ploiting, or commercializing any culture that is different. Commercial-
ization or commodification of culture is akin to collecting culture for
purposes of exploitation,2 observation, voyeurism, and objectification.
The western approach to globalization is keen to recognize culture as
an object rather than as a living, evolving organ to be shielded from
exploitation.3 To respond to western commodification of culture, this
article proposes that legal pluralism' is necessary, in the interim, to
protect culture from those who would, without authority or justifica-
tion, exploit it and reduce it to a short term and short-lived commod-
ity. The proposal to indigenize intellectual property law is for sure
only an interim measure to protect Indigenous resources up to and
until Indigenous Peoples have fully realized self-determination. In ad-
dition, the interim nature of this proposal reflects the legacy of coloni-
zation, with its complex extra- and intra-Indigenous power-oppression
relationships. Because Indigenous Peoples are rarely in a position to
exercise rights from a position of power, there is always risk in propos-
ing legal rules or models for protection that may not fully account for
the complex legacy of colonization. With this in mind, this article pro-
poses that legal pluralism is one workable interim means to indigenize
western intellectual property law in order to provide essential protec-
2. See MICHAEL A. BENGWAYAN, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT'L, INTELLEC-
TUAL AND CULTURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES IN
ASIA 20 (2003), available at http://www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=135.
Bengwayan joins a chorus of misappropriation opponents who repeatedly articulate
that "[c]orporations are well aware of how cost-efficient it is to tap the knowledge of
communities that live with and depend on biodiversity for their survival. Pharmaceu-
tical transnational corporations [ ] have taken plant samples from tropical forests
(identified and genetically manipulated by indigenous peoples) to use as raw materi-
als in developing new drugs." "In Asia, agricultural companies took disease resistant
seeds, [again] (identified and genetically manipulated by indigenous peoples). After
some modification, this genetic material was patented, mainly in the [United States],
and the resulting seeds or products were marketed .. " "Corporations have realized
enormous benefits from their free access to genetic materials, especially in the case of
crop plants from developing countries." Corporate monopolies, created by inequita-
ble application and enforcement of western IPR, have created a ferile paradox in
which corporate interest and profits are "built on and through the [mis]appropriation
of the [very] resources conserved and knowledge generated by indigenous peoples."
See id.
3. See Pradip Thomas and Francis B. Nyamnjoh, Intellectual Property Challenges
in Africa: Indigenous Knowledge Systems and the Fate of Connected Worlds, in INDIG-
ENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY: PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA 12, 22 (Isaac Mazonde and
Pradip Thomas eds., 2007).
4. See generally Paul L.A.H. Chartrand, Legal Pluralism: Reflections On The
Role Of Law In Providing Justice For Indigenous Peoples - A Canadian Context,
F.I.R.S.T. FOUNDATION, http://www.firstfound.org/vol. %201/chartl.htm.
208 [Vol. 15
2009] INDIGENIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 209
tions against the ongoing obliteration of Indigenous Peoples' rights,
identity, and resources.-
When this article promotes its theme of indigenizing intellectual
property law, it means to apply legal pluralism to justify employment
of Indigenous law as a primary source of law to begin the develop-
ment of a sui generis legal system to bring to the fore essential protec-
tions for Indigenous knowledge, tangible and intangible cultural
materials and artifacts, secret and sacred information and know-how,
cultural expressions, and the biogenetic resources justly owned and
possessed by Indigenous Peoples. By urging adoption of the in-
digenizing paradigm, this article implies that the current and most
widely used and recognized laws governing intellectual property are,
in their current form, incapable and at times inconsistent with protect-
ing the rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples in their resources
and intangible assets that have, through time, putatively derived from
their origins, their interactions with their environment, their adapta-
tions to the surrounding world, and their cosmology and creation
stories.
The discourse about Indigenous rights in the information age is
greatly enhanced by the opportunity to implement legal pluralism to
demonstrate the capacity for Indigenous law and legal systems,
whether complementary or not, to provide essential protections for
Indigenous resources and intangible assets. Recognizing that Indige-
nous law is equivalent to western intellectual property law would
evince a serious attempt by the dominant settler societies to work in
partnership with Indigenous Peoples to develop a meaningful sui
generis system of protection for Indigenous resources and intangible
assets.
But for more important reasons, invoking legal pluralism to in-
digenize or act upon western intellectual property law is essential for
protecting Indigenous resources and intangible assets. First, in a con-
tinually globalizing world, knowledge produces information that in
turn produces an intangible asset. Asset production has the ability to
create wealth and opportunities in Indigenous and neighboring com-
munities. Wealth creation and increased opportunity in turn have the
capacity to build infrastructures, enabling these communities to par-
ticipate in the global economy.
6
5. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], UNPFII Study on Customary Laws
Pertaining to Indigenous Traditional Knowledge and on to What Extend [sic] Such
Customary Laws Should Be Reflected in International and National Standards Ad-
dressing Traditional Knowledge, 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2007/10 (May 14-25, 2007)
[hereinafter Study on Customary Laws] (explaining that for many years, indigenous
peoples have expressed concern about the inadequate protection of their traditional
knowledge).
6. David V. Williams, Unique Treaty-Based Relationships Remain Elusive, in
WAITANGI REVISITED: PERSPECTIVES ON THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 370 (Michael
Belgrave, Merata Kawharu, and David Williams eds., 2nd ed. 2005) (Williams be-
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Second, invoking legal pluralism to indigenize western intellectual
property legal theory is required to protect the fundamental human
rights that are part and parcel of the respect for Indigenous resources
and intangible assets. In many Indigenous communities, the knowl-
edge that has originated and evolved with Indigenous Peoples through
experiences with their environments forms the basis of identity and
community values. Absent access to the knowledge, or acquiescing in
the misuse and misappropriation of that knowledge, Indigenous iden-
tities become hostage to external perceptions and influences that
often relegate Indigenous Peoples to subordinate or nonexistent sta-
tus at the fringes of the global community.
Third, invoking legal pluralism to indigenize western intellectual
property law promotes the principle of equivalence with respect to
legal systems. Thus, Indigenous communities are able to have recog-
nized their respective Indigenous laws, which will then influence how
parties are positioned in relation to Indigenous resources and intangi-
ble assets.7 This concept allows for democratic ideals to emerge
thereby allowing Indigenous law to be justly placed on par with west-
ern intellectual property law.
Legal pluralism is a reality, ignored by colonization, yet it previ-
ously was and presently is an essential function of society. There are
myriad examples in modern western legal systems when micro law
systems operate within larger, macro law systems, where the former is
parallel to and accommodated by the latter. One example is the prin-
ciple of federalism where state law sometimes operates alongside, in
addition to, or instead of federal law. Another example is the concept
of private ordering or self-regulation characterized by the law of the
firm or corporation or in the context of Internet activities. A third
example is the rise of the supranational legal regime, such as the Eu-
ropean Union. Thus, the concept of legal pluralism can be invoked as
the foundation for developing a sui generis system of legal protection
based upon Indigenous law in functional operation alongside state,
lieves that "by honouring Te Tiriti o Waitangi and by moving towards an authentic
biculturalism, we will enable vibrant, healthy communities to emerge within this land
of Aotearoa New Zealand.").
7. See id. at 370 (Williams attributes the dominant settler society's resistance to
bicultural legal pluralism to the desire to retain control over land and resources by
imposing one sovereign under one legal system-the laws of the Pakehd. He states
"PMkehd power-holders are unwilling to debate, let alone accommodate, tangata
whenua aspirations if they perceive that this will lead to a divided national sover-
eignty, separatism, or parallel justice systems. They almost always commit firmly to a
single national sovereignty with parliament as sovereign in which we are all New Zea-
land citizens under one law for all. If one moves away from the macro-scale national
debates to the many micro-scale examples of iwi and hapfl exercising local autonomy
and adhering to tikanga values, however, the present reality and future prospects for
bicultural legal pluralism seem less bleak.").
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national, and international laws to protect Indigenous resources and
intangible assets.8
II. ACKNOWLEDGING HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Profound is the reality that the benefits of globalization and world
trade are promoted without deference to the pervasive poverty that
persists in indigenous and minority communities around the world.
Why is it that development and progress are measured only in a snap-
shot of time? When raising issues of the rule of law, democracy, and
wealth distribution for Indigenous communities in contemporary soci-
ety, particularly in the area of integrating and applying Indigenous
law, distracting arguments center on certain long-held misperceptions
constructed by dominant settler societies about Indigenous Peoples
that reflect back to the "uncivilized savage." Historical images and
misperceptions of the uncivilized savage are rebranded in the public's
consciousness through settler-promoted, counter-mobilizing narra-
tives that promote cultural commodification and the ongoing and suc-
cessful repression of Indigenous Peoples.
These misperceptions are accompanied by certain irrational beliefs
about the inequities that will befall the dominant settler society in the
event that Indigenous Peoples reclaim their rights to land, territory,
and resources, i.e., the point at which the power-oppression paradigm
shifts toward normative balance. Some of the concerns about inequi-
table treatment are framed according to rights as material, tangible,
and rivalrous. The tug-of-war conception invoked by the dominant
settler society pits the primacy of the value of loss of property and
proprietary interests of whites against the value of loss suffered by
Indigenous Peoples; adheres a welfare-based framework and narrative
to Indigenous Peoples who are forced to rely upon the dominant set-
tler society for protection of Indigenous property and proprietary in-
terests; and derides any attempt to invoke a rights-based framework
for recognizing the legitimacy of Indigenous interests by proclaiming
that Indigenous Peoples' rights cannot co-exist with the dominant set-
tler society's rights, interests, laws, and policies. As a result, attempts
to place into service Indigenous law to indigenize western laws, in this
context intellectual property laws, are all but condemned as ancient,
inflexible and, at times, uncivilized.9
8. See Study on Customary Laws, supra note 5, at $ 3 (reporting that there exists
a relationship between indigenous traditional knowledge and customary laws, such
that the recommendation from the International Technical Workshop on Indigenous
Traditional Knowledge to the Permanent Forum was the "commission [of] a study on
'customary laws pertaining to indigenous traditional knowledge in order to investigate
to what extent such customary laws should be reflected in international and national
standards addressing indigenous traditional knowledge'").
9. See Larissa Behrendt, ACHIEVING SOCIAL JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND
AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE 32 (Federation Press 2003).
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Why is condemnation of Indigenous law so pervasive? Is this really
a rejection of legal pluralism as a theoretical concept or is the rejec-
tion of Indigenous law and its application to Indigenous land, territo-
ries, and resources something more inimical? There are several things
working against application of Indigenous law to protect Indigenous
resources. Some concerns about recognizing and adopting Indigenous
law are theoretical and relatively innocuous, while others are persist-
ently irrational and pretextual.
One concern that sits firmly in the former category is the degree of
complexity in identifying what is Indigenous law and determining how
that law reflects the values of the modern Indigenous community.
This concern is primarily resolved by entrusting Indigenous Peoples
with the development of Indigenous legal systems to respond to mod-
ern Indigenous life as a distinct segment of a larger society. What the
dominant settler society must do to facilitate this is to respect Indige-
nous legal systems and work toward synthesizing, as opposed to assim-
ilating, these systems. On the other side are irrational concerns of
diminishing rights for the dominant settler society. Without consider-
ing historical context, it is easy to understand why the dominant set-
tler society views Indigenous rights-based advocacy as harmful to its
interests. The dominant settler society has characteristically been able
to use Indigenous land, territory, and resources to achieve a very high
standard of living and quality of life for non-Indigenous societies.
These gains have exponentially increased with each benefiting genera-
tion of settler descendents. What Indigenous Peoples are attempting
to achieve is survival of their societies in the midst of the incalculable
wealth of non-Indigenous Peoples.
Survival of Indigenous Peoples does depend, in large measure, on
land restoration. To be clear, land functions as a base to rebuild Indig-
enous communities, to establish an economic footing in modern soci-
ety, and to restore and disseminate culture from the Indigenous
perspective. Even accepting the finite nature of land resources, the
dominant settler society must shed the view that rights, as a whole, are
too inflexible to represent anything more than material interests.
With particular attention to intellectual property rights, many of these
rights are best characterized as non-rivalrous and capable of being
used appropriately to retain the spirit of indigeneity without depleting
the resource for others to use in a manner culturally, economically,
and politically essential to the laws and customs developed under In-
digenous legal systems.
Recognizing historical context and linking it to the foundational
principle that rights-based advocacy is essential to the survival of In-
digenous Peoples is the primary democratic means of reconciling the
injustices historically and continuously exacted on Indigenous Peo-
ples. As Martin Luther King Jr. so aptly taught: Injustice anywhere is
a threat to justice everywhere. Larissa Behrendt seized upon this
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principle and gave it practical meaning for Indigenous Peoples when
she stated:
By failing to recognize Indigenous ownership and presence, Indige-
nous property rights are relegated to the status of a hand-out. Na-
tive Title is not seen as a property right descended from prior
occupation but a welfare measure: Indigenous people[s], when a le-
gitimate property right is recognized, are seen as getting something
for nothing.
Due to these perceptions, Indigenous rights are vulnerable, treated
differently, and given less protection than their non-Indigenous
equivalents.
10
Exposing historical injustices informs and conceptualizes purely
theoretical debate. Accordingly, the balance of this section is devoted
to describing, in brief, the colonization realities of three distinct Indig-
enous Peoples in the Pacific region.
A. Aboriginal Australia, Torres Strait Islands, and Terra Nullius
After Captain James Cook's explorations fixed the British govern-
ment's attention on the "Aboriginal" land now known as Australia in
1770, the First Fleet, carrying convicts and military, arrived in Sydney
Cove on 7 February 1788.11 Captain Arthur Phillip raised the British
flag in possession and claimed for the Crown the sovereignty and own-
ership of "Aboriginal" lands under the legal fiction, terra nullius.1 2
Terra nullius was the doctrinal vehicle by which Europeans and Aus-
tralian-Europeans dispossessed and depopulated the Aborigines for
the sole purpose of European frontier expansion. Terra nullius
ushered in European dominion and control over the natural resources
of the country. Terra nullius made it unnecessary for the Europeans
to entertain treaty negotiations with the Aborigines because the
Europeans did not recognize the existence of Aborigines much less
Aboriginal rights. 3 As explained by Ronald and Catherine Berndt:
The Aborigines were landholders, landowners in the broadest sense.
To the newer Australians who have supplanted them, land is a
source of wealth and of livelihood, a token of security and stability.
It was this to the Aborigines too; but because they approached it
from a different perspective, because they were semi-nomadic, and
because they did not divide up that land into parcels, individually
10. See id. at 171.
11. See generally Ronald M. and Catherine H. Berndt, THE WORLD OF THE FIRST
AUSTRALIANS: ABORIGINAL TRADITIONAL LIFE: PAST AND PRESENT, 490-499 (Ab-
original Studies Press 1999); see also Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992) 175 C.L.R 1, 32-
33; see also Terra Nullius, http://www.visitvictoria.com/displayobject.cfm/objectid.
0003A614-D962-1A88-8B4680C476A9047C/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
12. See Jonathan Wantrup, The Voyage of the First Fleet, 41 LA TROBE LIBRARY J.
30 (1988); see also Andrew Huff, Indigenous Land Rights and the New Self-Determi-
nation, 16 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 295, 298 (2005).
13. See Berndt, supra note 11, at 497.
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owned, their title to it was not acknowledged. In other words, most
of them lost the only tangible asset which had any real value in the
new situation of contact; and those who have not, those who still
live in Aboriginal reserves, do so virtually on sufferance. More than
that, because of the close tie between locality and religion, aliena-
tion of territory meant more than a straightforward economic loss.14
Terra nullius, the fiction used by European colonial nations to assert
sovereignty and ownership over "backward peoples"' lands, justified
British occupation of "Aboriginal" lands as well as justifying the act of
making Aboriginal culture and tradition invisible. The erasure of
Aboriginality, through land dispossession and cultural erosion, took
only 200 years from first contact.15
Despite the great successes achieved by the Europeans in dispos-
sessing and depopulating Aboriginal peoples, the homeland rights
movement in the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a resurgence of the fight
for Aboriginal land claims. 6 "Native Title" is the name given by the
High Court to Indigenous property rights recognized by the Mabo
judgment. 17 The judgment overthrew the legal fiction of terra nul-
lius."8 The judgment found that a native title to land existed in 1788,
and may continue to exist provided it has not been extinguished by
subsequent acts of government and provided Indigenous groups con-
tinue to observe their traditional laws and customs.19
B. Aotearoa/New Zealand and the Treaty of Waitangi
Maori (iwi (tribes), hapa (sub-tribes), and whanau) groups have
clashed with European colonizers and violently with each other post-
contact.20 The relationship that ensued between Maori and Europe-
ans represents the very example that Indigenous Peoples' colonization
histories are related, yet distinct. The Maori struggle to reassert sov-
ereignty, autonomy, and self-determination against the historical
backdrop of control over land, forests, waters, and fisheries is exem-
plified by the early historical Maori armed resistance.21 The modern
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Ronald Sackville, Legal Protection of Indigenous Culture in Australia, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 711, 732-33 (2003).
17. See, e.g., Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 32-36.
18. See Sackville, supra note 16.
19. See id. (explaining "[t]he decision in Mabo made it clear beyond argument that
indigenous laws and customs cannot simply be regarded as separate from and irrele-
vant to the general body of Australian law. On the contrary, those laws and customs
can be the source of entitlements enforceable in Australian courts. Moreover, the
language used by members of the High Court left no doubt about their view that a
grave historical injustice had been done to the Aboriginal peoples.").
20. See generally Tom Gibson, THE MAORI WARS: THE BRITISH ARMY IN NEW
ZEALAND 18-20 (Leo Cooper Ltd. 1974) (recounting first contact, Pakeha plans for
colonization, and Maori inter-tribal conflict over land and retention of power).
21. See id.
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movement to continue to press for Maori rights and the just settle-
ment of Maori claims also includes the recognition and protection of
Maori resource and intangible asset rights, which is the subject of po-
litical sovereignty and the quest for the proper and just interpretation
of the Treaty of Waitangi in this modern era.22
Before colonization, the traditional Maori relationship to the [land
and the] fisheries was "spiritual, collective, reciprocal, perpetual and
sustainable. ' '23 In Aotearoa, Maori land and resources were in great
demand from the beginning of European contact.2 4 As a result of this
great demand, even though statutory definition and British Colonial
Office interpretations placed Aotearoa/New Zealand outside of Brit-
ish dominion and control, New Zealand was confirmed as a British
economic interest.2 5
British economic interests precipitated the later "negotiation" of
the ambiguity-fraught Treaty of Waitangi. 6 The British considered
the Maori fearsome warriors, a tribal peoples, who represented a well-
armed majority in contrast to Pdkeha (foreign settlers).27 The Crown
determined that the doctrine of terra nullius could not be used de jure
against the Maori because "[t]hey [were not considered] Savages liv-
22. See David Williams, MATAURANGA MAORI AND TAONGA: THE NATURE AND
EXTENT OF TREATY RIGHTS HELD BY IwI AND HAPO IN INDIGENOUS FLORA AND
FAUNA, CULTURAL HERITAGE OBJECTS, AND VALUED TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 5
(2001); see also Symposium, Panel II: The Law and Policy of Protecting Folklore,
Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 753, 762-63 (2002) (reporting that in 1992 "[vlarious groupings of
[I]ndigenous [P]eoples had meetings. The most significant of all these meetings was
that of the Mata'atua. The people in Mata'atua are the nine tribes of New Zealand.
They promulgated the Mata'atua Declaration on the Cultural and Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This Mata'atua Declaration has been borrowed by
every subsequent group, and there are now about thirty of these [I]ndigenous
[P]eople[s'] promulgation declarations. Basically, [I]ndigenous [P]eoples want to de-
fine their own intellectual and cultural property and the way in which that intellectual
and cultural property is to be exploited.").
23. See Annie Mikaere, Settlement of Treaty Claims: Full and Final, and Fatally
Flawed?, 17 N.Z. UNIV. L. REV. 425, 444 (1997).
24. See id.
25. See P.G. McHugh, Constitutional Theory and Maori Claims, in WAITANGI:
MAORI AND PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 30 (I. H.
Kawharu, ed., 1989).
26. See id. ("In acquiring an imperium over other non-Christian societies, the
Crown consistently kept to the contractual model.... Treaties were a regular feature
of the formalities preceding the formal erection of an imperium over all non-Christian
societies which in British eyes had apparently reached a minimal degree of political
organization: only the Australian Aborigine, so primitive as scarcely to be human
some nineteenth century commentators thought, failed to cross this threshold....
The Treaty of Waitangi represents the application of the contractual theory as a basis
of the Crown's sovereignty over the Maori tribes."); see also R.J. Walker, The Treaty
of Waitangi as the Focus of Maori Protest in WAITANGI: MAORI AND PAKEHA PER-
SPECTIVES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI, supra note 25, at 263 (explaining that "be-
cause of serious discrepancies between the translated Maori version of that key article
and the English version, the Treaty is a morally dubious document").
27. See McHugh, supra note 25, at 31.
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ing by the Chase, but Tribes who have apportioned the country be-
tween them, having fixed Abodes, with an acknowledged Property in
the Soil, and with some rude approaches to a regular System of inter-
nal Government .... "28 Despite political shifts in British Government,
it was always determined that Maori consent remained a legal prereq-
uisite to British annexation.29 Furthermore, humanitarian movements
within Britain in the 1830s trumpeted the desire to protect "native
peoples" from the ill effects of imperialism, including disease, depopu-
lation, degradation, land dispossession, and racial extinction. 30
At worst, the Treaty of Waitangi represented a contractual vehicle
to accomplish annexation and assimilation of the Maori into the Brit-
ish settler community. At best, the Treaty of Waitangi represented an
unbridged gap between the expectations of Maori and Pdkeh .31 The
Treaty of Waitangi has a different meaning for Maori and non-Maori.
The treaty is steeped in ambiguity, as it was drafted in both Maori
language and English language, with the latter having multiple and
differing drafts.3 2 A gross oversimplification of the differences be-
tween the drafts is captured by a summary written by David V. Wil-
liams after a thorough and complete analysis of the available drafts of
the treaty, in which he deduces that "[f]or the Maori, power was to be
shared, while for the Crown, power was to be transferred, with the
Crown as Sovereign and the Maori as subject."3 3
To be clear, the Treaty of Waitangi is not the source of Maori rights
and law; instead "'Rangatiratanga,"' the tribal basis for Maori society,
arises from Maori customary law; [both, tribalism and customary law,]
are inseparable."34 Rangatiratanga is the traditional authority gov-
28. See id.
29. See id. at 30-31.
30. See id.
31. See David V. Williams, Te Tiriti o Waitangi - Unique Relationship Between
Crown and Tangata Whenua? in WAITANGI: MAORI AND PAKEHA PERSPECTIVES OF
THE TREATY OF WAITANGI, supra note 25, at 64, 79-80 ("The Maori text predicates a
sharing of power and authority in the governance of the country between Crown and
Maori. The English text is about a transfer of power, leaving the Crown as sovereign
and Maori as subjects. Much of the Treaty's history has been bedevilled by the fact
that Maori and [Pakeha] have been 'talking past each other."').
32. See id. at 76-78.
33. Ian Hugh Kawharu, Introduction WAITANGI: MAORI AND PAKEHA PERSPEC-
TIVES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI, supra note 25, at x, xvii. The Treaty of Waitangi
represents the contractual theory of sovereignty, in which there is an inherent bar-
gained-for exchange. The British sought to extend their sovereignty into the Pacific
by using contractual instruments. Thus, the benefit to the British was imperial expan-
sion; the question is what was the commensurate obligation. "In Article 1 of the
Treaty, the Maori were to cede their sovereignty over New Zealand to the British
Crown, and in return (by Articles 2 and 3), the Crown was to guarantee to protect the
Maori people's material assets, culture, and social system - while preserving for itself
a pre-emptive right of purchase of tribal land, and lastly, the Crown was to confer on
the Maori people the rights of British subjects."
34. See McHugh, supra note 25, at 25.
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erning Maori society." Thus, the Maori rights movement and the
pressing of claims against the Crown emanate not from the Treaty of
Waitangi but rather from Rangatiratanga, which, according to the Ma-
ori people, is incorporated into the Treaty of Waitangi.36 Accordingly:
Their consistent theme has been the demand for restoration of and
retention of tribal resources under tribal control where Maori cus-
tomary law is the governing code. Rangatiratanga thus covers most,
if not all, aspects of Maori community's affairs. It includes not only
the high profile issues of economic development, tenurial reform,
land claims, and the like, but can extend to [other tribal matters].
The tribal basis of Maori society and its continued vitality, indeed
existence, is thus central to Maori claims.37
Thus, Rangatiratanga and the Treaty of Waitangi can be each fairly
interpreted as jurisprudential components of the laws that govern cer-
tain relationships and resources in Aotearoa/New Zealand. In analyz-
ing Maori claims under a constitutional framework, P.G. McHugh
explains:
The Treaty of Waitangi, particularly the Maori version signed by
most of the chiefs, buttresses the claim of [R]angatiratanga under
the sovereignty of the Crown. The Treaty, it should be stressed, is
seen as an express recognition by the Crown of the incorporation of
[R]angatiratanga into the fabric of New Zealand society.... It is not
a consequence of Pakehd permission or acquiescence, but an inher-
ent attribute of Maori society.
38
Under this jurisprudential framework, it is more than fair to inter-
pret the Treaty of Waitangi as giving express recognition to the Indige-
nous laws of the Maori peoples. The recognition of Rangatiratanga
provides the basis for applying Indigenous law to Maori assets, land,
culture, and resources because it is this customary law that sustains
the continuity of rights. The Indigenous laws governing tribal prop-
erty and resource rights are common law rules that support establish-
ing a framework of legal pluralism.39 McHugh does not propose that
Rangatiratanga is a claim by Maori Peoples to a separate status but
instead as a limitation on Crown sovereignty. McHugh explains fur-
ther that "the political sovereignty of the community breathes life into
35. See id.
36. See Kawharu, supra note 33, at xix.
37. See McHugh, supra note 25, at 25.
38. See id.
39. See McHugh, supra note 25, at 26 ("The common law principles comprising
the doctrine of aboriginal rights, becoming accepted again in New Zealand after a
century of neglect, illustrate that such hostility is not inevitable. This doctrine does
not confront the legal doctrine of the Crown's sovereignty; indeed, the rules of aborig-
inal (land) title expressly harmonize with it. In the end, the common law principles
simply confirm the underlying constitutional premise. It is time for a more robust
approach, one which considers [R]angatiratanga in the light of the most fundamental
of constitutional principles: the sovereignty of the Crown.").
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[the] constitutional arrangement of government acting as a non-legal
check upon the Crown's exercise of its legal sovereignty. '40
C. The Kingdom of Hawai'i and the Mahele
Native Hawaiian kinship to their lands was forever compromised
following first contact.4' Westerners introduced the concept of land
ownership: from governments, which sought control over the Hawai-
ian islands for strategic naval and commercial purposes ranging from
refueling and resupplying military forces, to individuals who sought
the rich lands and soils for harvesting and planting, and selling indige-
nous mineral resources, rubber, fibers, fertilizers, sugar, coffee, cocoa,
vanilla, bananas, and fruits.42
In 1840, King Kamehameha III, seeking to straddle his nation's in-
dependence between warring Western empires, promulgated the first
constitution, which introduced land ownership across the islands.43
This 1840 constitution paved the way for the Mahele of 1848, the legal
mechanism that would authorize the monarchy to divide lands be-
tween the king, the government, the Ali'i (chiefs), and the people.44
Unfortunately, the authority to shift lands from the monarchs to vari-
ous constituents meant that the parcels of land more often than not
went to pay for newly acquired debts imposed by foreigners.45
With the Mahele of 1848, King Kamehameha III had hoped to give
his people land to call their own.46 While the Mdhele provided for
land ownership for the maka'dinana (people that attend the land) or
kanaka (people) to cultivate crops, such as taro, most Hawaiians of
the time could not embrace Western approaches to individual prop-
erty ownership, including the assessment of taxes and the obligation to
pay such taxes, which in reality were beyond affordability.47
40. McHugh, supra note 25, at 47.
41. See Danielle Conway-Jones, Safeguarding Hawaiian Traditional Knowledge
and Cultural Heritage: Supporting the Right to Self-Determination and Preventing the
Commodification of Culture, 48 How. L.J. 737, 748 (2005); see also PETER 0REBECH,
et al., THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1, 2 (2005)
(explaining that "[b]efore Europeans came to Hawai'i, the [Kanaka Maoli] had devel-
oped a complex culture based upon customary law. The islands were divided into pie-
shaped territories ("ahupua'a") running from the center of the island to the sea. Each
territory was under the jurisdiction of an ali'i or a noble.... Hawaiian customary law
allowed each resident of an ahupua'a to travel throughout the territory to engage in
gathering activities,... [such as] finding plants for medicinal and ceremonial purposes
42. Conway-Jones, supra note 41, at 748; see generally Pub. Access Shoreline v.
City Planning Comm'n., 903 P.2d 1246, 1263-68 (Haw. 1995)(discussing the develop-
ment of private property rights in Hawai'i pre- and post-Mahele).
43. Conway-Jones, supra note 41, at 748.
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Unsurprisingly, the institution of individual property ownership and
commensurate tax obligations quickly spelled the demise of the West-
ern legal recognition of Hawaiians' connection to the land.48 So
shortly thereafter, Westerners bought or gained, through mortgage
foreclosures and other "legal" means, many of the lands dispersed to
the ali'i and maka'dinana and began developing sugar plantations and
designing plans to protect their own individual interests in the is-
lands.49 These plans resulted in an overthrow of the monarchy in
1893, with the aid and support of American military troops and offi-
cials, forming the basis of annexation in 1898 in which Hawaiian lands
were ceded to the United States.5" This summary of events is the basis
for Hawaiian land claims and resource rights that to this day remain
unsettled.
III. ESPOUSING A RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
It is not indefensible to propose that the legacy of distinct coloniza-
tion histories should be considered when recognizing and establishing
a rights framework for protecting Indigenous resources. Giving
meaning to a rights-based framework in a modern society depends
largely on the practice of true democracy. True democracy stands for
the proposition that the least represented in a civilized society will
continue to enjoy participation and inclusion in the decisions that soci-
ety must make to accomplish fair, transparent, and respectful govern-
ance for individuals and for groups. With a democratic system of
governance, individuals and groups steadfastly rely on a rights frame-
work based on the rule of law to protect property, resources, and lib-
erty. Counter to a rights-based framework is the welfare-based
framework of protection. A welfare-based framework limits advocacy
to what can be achieved by a minority through the beneficence of the
majority. Most clear, the welfare-based system is exemplified by the
reliance of segments of society on the benevolence of others, such as
the majority or its governments.
For various reasons, a welfare-based framework, standing alone, is
ineffective to protect Indigenous Peoples and their resources. A wel-
fare-based framework would create obstacles in establishing accounta-
bility and enforcing recognized legal rights. With respect to the
relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, the welfare-
based framework reinforces the fallacy that the colonized have little to
offer while the colonizer has everything to give; notwithstanding that
48. Id.
49. Conway-Jones, supra note 41, at 749; Felix S. Cohen et al., COHEN'S HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 367 (LexisNexis 2005).
50. Id.; Joint Resolution to acknowledge the 100th anniversary of the January 17,
1893 overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i, and to offer an apology to Native
Hawaiians on behalf of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of
Hawai'i, 103 Public Law 150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
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such beneficence comes with a price. The welfare-based framework
actively encourages Indigenous invisibility and radically erodes Indig-
enous independence and self-determination. The byproduct of adher-
ing to a welfare-based system to address the recognition and
protection of Indigenous Peoples and their resources has been the sys-
tematic and ongoing process of land dispossession, resource exploita-
tion, and misappropriation of culture. Accordingly, a rights-based
framework is the most effective and just means to correct the political,
social and cultural imbalances plaguing Indigenous Peoples. A rights-
based framework is also the mechanism to stem the harms resulting
from Indigenous land dispossession, depopulation, and cultural
impoverishment.
About the impact that rights-based advocacy within the United Na-
tions system has had on Aboriginals, Mick Dodson described the feel-
ing that Aboriginal Peoples are not alone in the struggle to secure
Indigenous rights. He stated:
We now see that it is a global struggle, not just between a single
Indigenous [P]eople and a government, but between the world's In-
digenous [P]eoples and the world's colonial governments. While
our version of the struggle has its local variants, all our struggles tell
essentially the same story. We are still all dealing with the legacy of
colonialism. Indigenous [P]eople speak about the gross violations
of their peoples' rights and put up innovative, substantial proposals
for change.51
On the international stage, the clarion-call for the recognition and
protection of Indigenous Peoples, their lands, and their resources
under a rights-based framework was first sounded in 1923 by
Deskaheh, Cayuga chief and Speaker of the Six Nations Council, who
promoted self-determination by, among other courageous acts, sub-
mitting a petition to the League of Nations, in Geneva, Switzerland
via the government of the Netherlands in order to challenge Canadian
encroachment onto Iroquois territory. 52 This rights-based framework
is embodied in various international documents, most specific, the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
which was adopted on September 13, 2007. The saliency of the Decla-
ration begins another phase of the rights-based discourse first ad-
dressed on the international stage by Deskaheh and later envisioned
by Indigenous activists like Dodson.
The Declaration rewrites the narrative of Indigenous claims to land
and other inextricably linked resource rights and expressly promotes a
collective rights-based framework for bringing justice to Indigenous
Peoples who have been systemically dispossessed, depopulated, and
51. Mick Dodson, Comment to INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 62, 64 (Sarah Pritchard ed., 1998).
52. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 84 (Bruce El-
liot Johansen ed., 1998).
220 [Vol. 15
2009] INDIGENIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 221
replaced by settler-colonization. The aim of this article is to promote
further movement toward employing the rights-based framework of
the Declaration and other source documents to establish complemen-
tary legal mechanisms for the recognition and protection of Indige-
nous resources and intangible assets.
A. International System of Laws and International Institutions
It has often been said and repeated that the United Nations, while
imperfect, is the best hope for humanity." This statement, critically
important in the field of human rights, is no less a crucial guiding prin-
ciple for economic empowerment and development. As there is an
indisputable imperative to bring values and a conscience to the fair
and just treatment of individuals by other individuals, governments,
and nations, there is an equal and compelling need to bring a con-
science to commerce in the modern, dynamic information and knowl-
edge industries and markets. Through the hard fought and tireless
efforts of dedicated Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples, an all
too often ignored or forgotten segment of the global community has
seized upon their Indigenous birthright to press for recognition and
protection of culture, identity, land, and resources through the inter-
national system.
Social justice advocates correctly conclude that the human rights
system has become an increasingly important arena for reminding
governments of their internationally mandated obligations. 54 Further-
more, a basic knowledge of international law and international institu-
tions is vital to the successful implementation of a rights-based
framework to secure meaningful recognition and protection of Indige-
nous Peoples around the globe. International law and international
institutions are powerful in that they legitimize and influence the de-
velopment of national laws, regional agreements, and judicial applica-
tion of these laws and agreements within country borders. The United
Nations organization promoting a rights-based framework for Indige-
nous Peoples is the Working Group on Indigenous Populations
(WGIP), which has succeeded in lobbying the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly to adopt the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.56
53. Sarah Pritchard, Olga Havnen & Anne Martin, Preface to INDIGENOUS PEO-
PLES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 51, at vi, viii.
54. See id. at vi, vi-viii.
55. See Sarah Pritchard, The Significance of International Law, in INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 2, 7.
56. See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A.
Res. 61/295, at 1, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295
(Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_
en.pdf [herinafter U.N. DRIP]; see also Chidi Oguamanam, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY,
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The WGIP represents the Indigenous Peoples' will to resist and re-
ject assimilation. While at the lowest level of the human rights system
of hierarchy,57 the Working Group has ignited and galvanized an In-
digenous Movement to promote and protect the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of Indigenous populations and to articulate
standards commensurate with the aims of cementing a rights-based
framework to secure justice and fairness for the world's Indigenous
populations.
About the Working Group, Mick Dodson, the first Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, stated:
The Working Group has come to play a far more extensive role than
its mandate would suggest. It is a fine example of how we can use
existing structures and transform them to meet our needs and aspi-
rations. As the meeting place between the world's Indigenous
[Pleoples and key international organizations, the Working Group
has provided many of us with a unique opportunity to interact with
a world that would be otherwise impenetrable. We have made sure
that it has functioned as a highly visible platform where we can
draw attention to our grievances.
It has also been more than that. The Working Group has become
the focal point of our coming together as the world's Indigenous
[P]eoples. In a sense the Working Group is all about what interna-
tional law and the UN have neglected. It is about bringing Indige-
nous [P]eople[s] into the UN system where we have been
marginalized and unnoticed. It is about forcing the UN system to
face its responsibility as the body charged with protecting the rights
of all people. It is about transforming the UN from a club serving
the interests of its members, namely nation States and their well-
suited diplomats, to a body of all peoples.58
B. International Treaties and Agreements
Principles of State sovereignty do not have meaning or application
with respect to relationships between States and their Indigenous Peo-
AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 201 (University of Toronto Press, 2006). The author
states:
At present, two important fora, namely, the [Convention on Biological Di-
versity] CBD and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), re-
present the most visible venues in which discussions about national and
global policies on indigenous knowledge are conducted. Collaboration be-
tween these two bodies encourages and facilitates a holisitic and coordinated
approach to the [complex phenomenon of cultural integrity of indigenous
knowledge]. Recent and ongoing developments in the two fora show that
they are inclined toward an inward looking approach in the quest for a
mechanism of protection for indigenous knowledge and interests.
57. The work of the WGIP must pass through the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights
and then to the Economic and Social Council before reaching the United Nations
General Assembly.
58. See Dodson, supra note 51, at 62-64.
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pies.59 State sovereignty cannot be invoked by a State against its peo-
ples. Human rights must take precedence over State sovereignty
rights. It is important to recognize that the early human rights system
constructed by the United Nations did not recognize the rights of
groups or peoples.6" Since then, there has been a development of in-
quiry about how States should address and respond to group or indi-
vidual rights. It may be emphasized then that self-determination is a
substantive right vested in Indigenous Peoples. The right of self-de-
termination is contained within international human rights law and
thus attracts the obligation of States to protect it and make it effective
in a domestic context.61
Self-determination in modern practice requires applying principles
of human rights laws and extending human rights protections to any
area of Indigenous life that will ensure survival of Indigenous culture
and the sustainability of Indigenous resources. Victoria Tauli-Corpuz
captured the essence of the relationship between Indigenous land, re-
sources, and culture when she stated, "[t]raditional knowledge, culture
and resource rights, along with self-determination and territorial
rights, are all intertwined and inextricably linked with heritage."62
Accordingly, Indigenous survival depends on protecting the human
rights of Indigenous People in all facets of their interconnected exis-
tence, which is based on familial relationships with land, knowledge
systems, resources, and culture, all impacting what the western world
would identify as property rights, either real or intellectual. Recogniz-
59. Notes on the presentation made by Matthias Ahrens, Saami Council, Member
of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, entitled "International
Intellectual Property: An Indigenous Perspective," sponsored by the University of
Hawai'i at Manoa, William S. Richardson School of Law on April 19, 2007 in Hono-
lulu, Hawai'i.
60. Because it seems that ILO Convention No. 169 takes the view that Indigenous
Peoples are not parties to the convention (this position is questionable now with the
adoption of the U.N. DRIP), its provisions will not be analyzed beyond this footnote.
Article 15(2) of the ILO Convention No. 169 provides:
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface
resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall
establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peo-
ples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests
would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for
the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands.
The peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of
such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages which
they may sustain as a result of such activities.
See Int'l Labor Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, art. 15 (Jun. 27, 1989), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
employment/skillslhrdr/instr/c_169.htm.
61. See Chartrand, supra note 4.
62. Gregory K. Schlais, The Patenting of Sacred Biological Resources, the Taro Pat-
ent Controversy in Hawai'k A Soft Law Proposal, 29 U. Haw. L. Rev. 581, 586 n.26
(2007) (citing VICTORIA TAULI-CORPUZ, BIODEVERSITY, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
AND RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2006)).
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ing the need to extend human rights laws to traditional resources and
culture is the difference between human rights in theory versus human
rights in practice. Undertaking to implement international human
rights laws and policies into national laws for the recognition and pro-
tection of Indigenous resources and intangible assets represents a start
to closing a gap in protection. By virtue of the right to self-determina-
tion, Indigenous Peoples freely determine their political status and
freely pursue economic, social, and cultural development, which in-
cludes determining appropriate uses of traditional knowledge, cultural
expressions, and natural and biological resources.63 In contrast, it can-
not be argued that when it comes to western intellectual property
rights there are few gaps in protection, as these are some of the
strongest rights in the world.
Understandably, Indigenous Peoples have an aversion to western
intellectual property rights protection systems because they do not ac-
count for the contextual history of Indigenous Peoples nor do they
take into account the necessity for Indigenous resources to be pro-
tected by complementary Indigenous laws. Often intellectual prop-
erty laws have been used by dominant settler societies against
Indigenous Peoples to dispossess the latter of their culture, identity,
and assets in the same fashion that the former perfected the art of
land dispossession. The use of dominant settler society's law to exact
these dispossessions justifies skepticism about the efficacy of western
intellectual property law's capacity to protect Indigenous resources.
In fact, colonization histories provide myriad examples of the subjuga-
tion of Indigenous law to western law. The absence of Indigenous
legal systems renders any protection of Indigenous resources
impotent.
The modern practice of treating the recognition and protection of
Indigenous resources as a human rights issue is a global imperative,
especially in light of the pervasiveness of the western intellectual
property rights system in every sphere of social, economic, and politi-
cal life. It is against this backdrop that relevant international docu-
ments are reviewed for the purpose of advancing the proposition that
protecting Indigenous resources is a human rights issue.
63. See Paoakalani Declaration, Ka 'Aha Pono '03: Native Hawaiian Intellectual
Property Rights Conference, Waikiki, Hawai'i, Oct. 2003, reprinted in R. Hokulei
Lindsey, Responsibility with Accountability: The Birth of a Strategy to Protect Kanaka
Maoli Traditional Knowledge, 48 How. L.J. 763, 771-73 (2005) [hereinafter,
"Paoakalani Declaration"].
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THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR)
THE UNIVERSAL BILL OF RIGHTS
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "the cor-
nerstone of modern international human rights law,"64 is based on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"). The UDHR
emerged from the aftermath of World War II destruction and was
adopted in 1948. The UDHR is the foundation for both the ICCPR
and the ICESCR. All three of these documents make up the Univer-
sal Bill of Rights. These human rights law instruments establish the
right of self-determination in the following terms:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.
Furthermore, Member States of the United Nations are required to
respect that right:
The States Parties ... shall promote the realization of the right of
self determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
This document represents the first agreement among nations as to the
enumerated rights and freedoms of all persons in the world."
ICCPR
The General Assembly adopted the ICCPR on December 16, 1966.
The Covenant came into force on March 23, 1976. The ICCPR cre-
ated the Human Rights Committee (HRC). The HRC, based in Ge-
neva, is responsible for the implementation of the ICCPR by Member
States. The HRC also monitors compliance with ICCPR provisions by
Member States by requiring and reviewing regular submission of re-
ports by each State party on how the rights are being implemented.66
The Covenant comprises 53 articles, which are broken up into six
parts. Of these 53 Articles, the first 27 give people throughout the
world various civil and political rights without regard to race, color,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. Relevant to this article, the
rights enumerated in the Covenant are the right to self-determination,
64. William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277
(1995).
65. U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights [UNHCR], International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, available at http://
www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR].
66. See Human Rights Committee, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2009).
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the right to life, the right to liberty and security of person, freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion, the freedom of expression, and the
right to vote and participate in public affairs. Specifically, Article 27
provides:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities ex-
ist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to
use their own language 67
The comment to Article 27 explains the Committee's interpretation
that individuals, to enjoy a particular culture, must be protected in
their way of life, which is closely associated with territory and use of
its resources, even though Article 27 does not prejudice the sover-
eignty or territorial integrity of a State party.68 The Committee goes
on to explain about Article 27 that "culture manifests itself in many
forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land
resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples.... The enjoy-
ment of those rights may require positive legal measures of protection
and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of mi-
nority communities in decisions [that] affect them."69 Finally, the
Committee concludes:
[A]rticle 27 relates to rights whose protection imposes specific obli-
gations on States parties. The protection of these rights is directed
towards ensuring the survival and continued development of the
cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned,
thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole. Accordingly, the
Committee observes that these rights must be protected as such and
should not be confused with other personal rights conferred on one
70and all under the Covenant....
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS (ICESCR)
After the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, the Commission turned
its attention to drafting a Covenant on Human Rights.7 1 The Cove-
nant only included civil and political rights until the United Nations
67. ICCPR, supra note 65, at art. 27.
68. See U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], Office of the High Comm'r for
Human Rights, CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities),
3.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994), available at http://www.
unhchr.org/refworld/docid/453883fc0.html (explaining further in paragraph 6.2 that
"[ajlthough the rights protected under article 27 are individual rights, they depend in




71. Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human
Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1039, 1060 (2007) (summarizing the events
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Economic and Social Council instructed the Commission to include
economic, social and cultural rights. 72 The Covenant included rights
from both the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Debates ensued over the
combination of rights in a single document. 73 In response, the Gen-
eral Assembly requested the "two covenants to contain, in order to
emphasize the unity of aim in view and to ensure respect for and ob-
servance of human rights, as many similar provisions as possible."74
Peter Yu explains that "the portion of the draft covenant that con-
tained economic, social, and cultural rights became the ICESCR, and
the rest of the draft Covenant became the ICCPR.
' 75
As of April 18, 2008 there are 158 parties to the Covenant and 67
signatories. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
is composed of a group of independent experts who monitor the im-
plementation of the ICESCR by each Member State that is party to
the agreement. These States submit regular reports on how economic,
social, and cultural rights are being implemented.
Civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights are considered
universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated.76 These
human rights are guaranteed so as to ensure that individuals become
and remain free from fear and free from want.7 7 The most relevant
rights for the purposes of this article are contained in Article 15, which
states:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material inter-
ests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Cove-
nant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those
necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion
of science and culture.
leading up to the creation of the Universal Bill of Rights. The drafting history ana-





76. ICCPR, supra note 65, pmbl.; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of
Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting
from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is an Author
(Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12,
2006), available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/escgencom17.html (explaining that
human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements belonging to
individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of individuals and communities)
[hereinafter ECOSOC, General Comment No. 17].
77. See ECOSOC, General Comment No. 17, supra note 76, 1.
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3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect
the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative
activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits
to be derived from the encouragement and development of interna-
tional contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural
fields.78
The Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights articulates
the basic premise of Article 15 as "the right of everyone to benefit
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the
author is a human right, which derives from the inherent dignity and
worth of all persons." 79 The Committee insists that the above human
rights protection should be distinguished from most legal entitlements
recognized in intellectual property systems. The Committee supports
distinguishing human rights from intellectual property rights by
explaining:
Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitle-
ments belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances,
groups of individuals and communities. Human rights are funda-
mental as they are inherent to the human person as such, whereas
intellectual property rights are first and foremost means by which
States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity,
encourage the dissemination of creative and innovative productions,
as well as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the
integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions for the benefit
of society as a whole.
In contrast to human rights, intellectual property rights are gener-
ally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned
to someone else. While under most intellectual property systems,
intellectual property rights, often with the exception of moral rights,
may be allocated, limited in time and scope, traded, amended and
even forfeited, human rights are timeless expressions of fundamen-
tal entitlements of the human person. Whereas the human right to
benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests re-
sulting from one's scientific, literary and artistic productions safe-
guards the personal link between authors and their creations and
between peoples, communities, or other groups and their collective
cultural heritage, as well as their basic material interests which are
necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living,
intellectual property regimes primarily protect business and corpo-
rate interests and investments. Moreover, the scope of protection
of the moral and material interests of the author provided for by
article 15, paragraph 1 (c), does not necessarily coincide with what is
78. See Yu, supra note 71, at 1042 n.6 (presenting a thorough discussion about the
drafting of the ICESCR and debates that ensued over whether to include an intellec-
tual property protection clause as a cultural right).
79. See ECOSOC, General Comment No. 17, supra note 76, 1.
2009] INDIGENIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 229
referred to as intellectual property rights under national legislation
or international agreements.
8u
By presenting intellectual property rights systems and human rights
laws as competing paradigms, the Committee can readily support its
conclusion that these two areas should not be equated. With respect
to Indigenous Peoples, what the Committee seems not to consider ex-
pressly is how Indigenous law can be used to further the human rights
goals of the ICESCR without necessarily invoking some or many of
the ill-suited qualities of western intellectual property rights regimes
promoted under national legislation or international agreements. In-
stead of applying Indigenous law to regulate protection of Indigenous
resources and intangible assets under a human rights framework, the
Committee reverts to the default position of adopting measures under
existing intellectual property law regimes to protect the moral and
material interests of authors. In describing the specific legal obliga-
tions under Article 15, the Committee explains:
With regard to the right to benefit from the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artis-
tic production of indigenous peoples, States parties should adopt
measures to ensure the effective protection of the interests of indig-
enous peoples relating to their productions, which are often expres-
sions of their cultural heritage and traditional knowledge. In
adopting measures to protect scientific, literary and artistic produc-
tions of indigenous peoples, States parties should take into account
their preferences. Such protection might include the adoption of
measures to recognize, register and protect the individual or collec-
tive authorship of indigenous peoples under national intellectual
property rights regimes and should prevent the unauthorized use of
scientific, literary and artistic productions of indigenous peoples by
third parties. In implementing these protection measures, State par-
ties should respect the principle of free, prior and informed consent
of the indigenous authors concerned and the oral or other custom-
ary forms of transmission of scientific, literary or artistic production;
where appropriate, they should provide for the collective adminis-
tration by indigenous peoples of the benefits derived from their
productions.
8 1
While Article 15 of the ICESCR provides a foundation for enforcing
the rights of everyone to benefit from moral and material interests of
intellectual authorship, it stops short of addressing the human rights of
Indigenous Peoples to have their Indigenous resources and intangible
assets recognized, protected, promoted, and disseminated in accor-
dance with what is deemed acceptable under Indigenous law.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
The Declaration is a non-binding, aspirational12 document adopted
on September 13, 2007 by the United Nations General Assembly after
more than two decades of debate.83 The text outlines the rights of the
world's estimated 370 million Indigenous People.84 The Declaration
arose out of the absence of international human rights law regarding
Indigenous Peoples.8 The Declaration may be viewed as a "frame-
work for human rights based dialogue between Indigenous Peoples
and States."86
The Declaration was first conceived at the Working Group on In-
digenous Populations' fourth session in 1985.87 While Indigenous
Peoples are classified as the poorest and most vulnerable groups in the
world, those who have ushered in the Declaration are optimistic that,
as a living document at the national and international levels, it will
promote a vision of development and prosperity for Indigenous
Peoples.88
The adoption of the Declaration in its present form represents a
watershed moment in rights-based advocacy for Indigenous Peoples.
In this long awaited action, Indigenous Peoples expressly rejected a
welfare-based system of governance that subordinated their interests,
their law, their culture, and their very survival. The Declaration, a
manifesto of sorts, stands quite separate and apart from most United
Nations covenants, treaties, and declarations. The Declaration is
unique in several respects. First, the Declaration is significant and dis-
tinct in that Indigenous Peoples are represented in the document by
82. See U.N. DRIP, supra note 56. The Preamble to the Declaration "[s]olemnly
proclaims [that its content reflects] a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit
of partnership and mutual respect ..
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Megan Davis, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (Univ. of N.S.W. Faculty of Law Research Series 2008, Working Paper No. 16,
2008), available at http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps08/art16.
86. The preambular language of the Declaration "[e]ncourag[es] States to comply
with and effectively implement all their obligations as they apply to indigenous peo-
ples under international instruments, in particular those related to human rights, in
consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned." U.N. DRIP, supra note
56.
87. See Pritchard, supra note 51, at 7.
88. See U.N. DRIP, supra note 56. The preambular language to the Declaration
provides, in part, the following:
Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting
them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain
and strengthen their institutions, cultures, and traditions, and to promote
their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs,
Recognizing that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional
practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper
management of their environment ....
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self and not by any government or State.89 This is critical because
Indigenous Peoples, since colonization, have argued that it is, in fact,
the government or State actor that has been responsible for myriad
rights violations against them throughout history and into the present.
Second, the Declaration represents the political will of a highly or-
ganized body of Indigenous Peoples from around the world who de-
veloped a sophisticated rights-based framework lobby that challenged
the legitimacy of the welfare-based framework pressed into service by
governments and United Nations leadership, who in the past strongly
opposed adopting a broad rights-based framework to recognize and
protect Indigenous Peoples and their resources. To summarize Les
Malezer, the Indigenous Peoples on the international stage devised a
sophisticated and effective Global Caucus of Indigenous Peoples.90
According to Malezer, this collective action was an absolute necessity
because the abuses against Indigenous Peoples around the globe had
reached critical levels, requiring Indigenous Peoples to ignore territo-
rial borders in order to address these gross and institutionalized
human rights violations with a near unified voice. 9'
To achieve this unified lobby, Indigenous Peoples worked in seven
regional caucuses - Africa, Asia, the Pacific, Latin America, North
America, the Arctic, and Russia - to develop a comprehensive rights-
based framework that is now embodied in the Declaration. The Indig-
enous Peoples in the seven regions then appointed seven representa-
tives, respectively, to work at the international level to lobby at the
United Nations for the recognition and protection of Indigenous Peo-
ples and their resources. Arguably, the distinct organizational struc-
ture of the Indigenous Global Caucus, which allowed for the
development and adoption of a clear and unalterable rights-based po-
sition, contributed greatly to the legitimacy of the aspirations of Indig-
enous Peoples, so much so that governments became unwilling to vote
against Indigenous Peoples regarding the adoption of the Declaration.
This unwillingness was a testament to the superior organization of the
Caucus, especially considering that during all negotiations, Indigenous
89. See Erica-Irene A. Daes, Equality of Indigenous Peoples Under the Auspices of
the United Nations - Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 493, 496-97 (1995) ("The Draft Declaration acknowledges indige-
nous peoples as 'peoples' in the international sense, but recognized that they continue
to possess a distinct collective legal character and standing even in cases where they
have agreed to be incorporated into existing states. This is of cardinal importance
because indigenous peoples generally do not aspire to separate statehood; while, at
the same time, they do not see that they can ever accept complete integration into the
states [comprising] the United Nations. Although equal in law to all other peoples,
indigenous peoples tend to prefer partnerships over separate statehood or complete
integration. To protect the integrity of these basic arrangements, indigenous peoples
must continue to enjoy a legal status of their own, and access to international fora.").
90. November 26, 2008 presentation made by Les Malezer at the University of
Hawai'i at Manoa, Kamakakuokalani Center for Hawaiian Studies.
91. See id.
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Peoples remained on message that they would make no concessions
on land rights.
Third, Indigenous Peoples remained resolute on the issue of land
rights and did not waiver in their position not to make concessions as
to these rights. The Declaration unapologetically provides:
Article 25
Indigenous Peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or
otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal
seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to fu-
ture generations in this regard.92
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or oth-
erwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and con-
trol their lands, territories and resources that they possess by
reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation
or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands,
territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted
with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure sys-
tems of the indigenous peoples concerned.93
It is very likely that had Indigenous Peoples made concessions as to
land rights during previous lobbying efforts for a Declaration, such
would have augured well for earlier adoption. Surely though, such
concessions would have likely diluted the very objectives that embody
the human rights movement of Indigenous Peoples - the right to self
determination; to own and control Indigenous lands, territories, and
resources, and the right to free, prior, and informed consent. In fact,
Indigenous land rights and the means by which these rights were vio-
lated form the basis of or foundation for various Indigenous modern
claims for recognition and protection of and redress for harms to land,
culture, and peoples. Without the anchor of land rights for Indige-
nous Peoples - the first peoples - other legitimate claims - such as
recognition and protection of culture, religion, language, education,
employment, health, economic participation and development, and in-
tangible assets and resources - lose traction.94
92. U.N. DRIP, supra note 56. Articles 25 and 26 are included in Part VI of the
Declaration, which contain those provisions relating to "Land and Resources."
93. Id.
94. See id. Articles 1-5 comprise Part I and relate to "Fundamental Rights." See
also Daes, supra note 89, at 495 ("Part I is a statement of the fundamental principles
of equality and non-discrimination, with regard to indigenous peoples collectively as
peoples, and individually as human persons. In this context, specific reference is
made to self-determination, not because it is a right of indigenousness, but as a right
of all peoples, of which indigenous peoples cannot be denied. We have stated this in
the most unambiguous terms, because the equality of indigenous peoples has so fre-
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Despite the decades long resolve of Indigenous Peoples at all levels
- international, regional, national, and local - some observers in the
intellectual property arena proposed that Indigenous Peoples, in order
to best protect their intellectual property, should minimize their reli-
ance on land rights in order to take advantage of existing western in-
tellectual property options for protection of Indigenous resources and
intangible assets. The Declaration's adoption proves that such a strat-
egy, at the very least, is inconsistent with the goals and objectives of
Indigenous Peoples; at worst, such a strategy seeks to continue pro-
moting the welfare-based framework, which necessarily marginalizes
and subordinates Indigenous Peoples' interests, laws, and culture to
the laws of the dominant settler society. It is the law of the dominant
settler society that, when implemented, worked the exact injustice on
Indigenous Peoples that led to the generational struggle for interna-
tional human rights that Indigenous Peoples have been waging since
first contact and colonization.
Consistent with the worldview of Indigenous Peoples - that in most
cases Indigenous resources are inextricably linked to Indigenous lands
and territories - their Indigenous resources and intangible assets re-
present a distinct aspect of self and therefore represent a component
of the right of self-determination. By virtue of this right, Indigenous
Peoples did not capitulate to cacophonous calls by intellectual prop-
erty law scholars, practitioners, and government officials to work
within the western intellectual property rights framework. Instead,
quently been denied in the past on racist grounds."). Articles 6 and 7 comprise Part II
and relate to "Life and Security." See id. ("Part II of the Draft Declaration broadly
recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their physical existence and cultural
identity. It rejects the four principal threats to indigenous peoples survival today:
forced relocation, forced assimilation, militarization of their territories, and official
denial of their indigenous identity."). Articles 8-13 comprise Part III of the Declara-
tion, which relate to "Culture, Religion, and Language." Articles 14-17 comprise Part
IV and relate to "Education, Media and Employment." Articles 18-24 comprise Part
V and relate to "Participation and Development." See id. ("Parts III, IV and V of the
Draft Declaration focus on issues of special concern to indigenous peoples in the ex-
ercise of their rights to equality, self-determination and collective identity. These is-
sues include religious, spiritual, cultural and linguistic freedom, and the renewal of
indigenous institutions in the fields of education, health, economy and communica-
tions. In broad terms, these parts of the Draft Declaration deal with aspects of
strengthening the distinctiveness of indigenous societies, within the institutional
frameworks of existing states."). Articles 33-37 comprise Part VII and relate to "Self-
Government and Indigenous Laws." See id. at 496 ("Part VII provides some general
guidelines for those situations in which indigenous peoples exercise their political
rights through forms of autonomy or internal self-government within existing states.
It also clarifies the responsibility of indigenous peoples' own institutions to respect
"internationally recognized human rights standards."). Articles 38-42 comprise Part
VIII and relate to " Implementation." See id. ("Part VIII addresses the specific re-
sponsibilities of states and the future role of the international community, in ensuring
recognition and respect for the rights of indigenous peoples and the implementation
of the provisions of the Draft Declaration."). Finally, Articles 43-46 comprise Part IX
and relate to "Minimum Standards & Respect for Human Rights."
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the Indigenous Peoples Caucus lobbied for and won inclusion of Arti-
cle 31 in the Declaration:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and tradi-
tional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sci-
ences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic
resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna
and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional
games and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to
maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property
over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional
cultural expressions.95
The power and promise of the Declaration becomes apparent upon
review of the countries that voted against the Declaration's adoption.
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States voted against
adoption of the Declaration. Representatives from these countries
have cited many reasons for their respective positions. Some have
proffered that the Declaration does not reflect a workable state prac-
tice. For example, opponents to the Declaration posit the land condi-
tions would encompass most of their country and allocate rights to
Indigenous Peoples that would not be equally shared by others.96
Specifically, these opponents argue that, as written, the Declaration
would appear to require governments to offer a right to redress to
Indigenous Peoples and provide compensation for the value of an en-
tire country.97 Still further, the Declaration's opponents argue that it
is inconsistent with the legal tradition of States.98 Even though the
95. U.N. DRIP, supra note 56, at art. 31.
96. See id. at art. 27. Article 27 provides:
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples
concerned, fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving
due recognition to indigenous peoples' laws, traditions, customs and land ten-
ure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples per-
taining to their lands, territories and resources, [emphasis added] including
those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indig-
enous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process.
97. Cf. id. at art. 28. Article 28 provides:
Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include res-
titution, or when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation,
for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned
or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, oc-
cupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.
Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensa-
tion shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality,
size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate
redress.
98. U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept.
13, 2007); Cf. U.N. DRIP, supra note 56. Article 46 provides:
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State,
people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any
act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authoriz-
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Declaration provides for the protection of territorial integrity and sov-
ereignty,99 Australia failed to endorse the document because leaders
fear unintended consequences from the Declaration's references to
self-determination, which, in the opposition leadership's opinion,
might give rise to Indigenous law taking precedence over state law.'00
V. THE CHALLENGE OF INDIGENIZING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
In spite of the political magnitude of the adoption of the U.N.
DRIP, Indigenous Peoples pursuing rights-based initiatives, such as
the recognition and protection of Indigenous resources and intangible
assets, are campaigning in a post civil rights society against counter
mobilization forces of sovereign nations. Sovereign counter-mobiliza-
tion efforts include the limitation of rights. The four nations opposing
the adoption of the U.N. DRIP are similarly opposed to concepts of
legal pluralism.101 One can argue that those opposed to invoking legal
pluralism to recognize the legitimacy of Indigenous law to protect In-
ing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or
in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and indepen-
dent States.
In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human
rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of
the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such limita-
tions as are determined by law and in accordance with international human
rights obligations. Any such limitation shall be non-discriminatory and
strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and re-
spect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most
compelling requirements of democratic society.
99. See U.N. DRIP, supra note 56; see also Adam Gartrell, Opposition Indigenous
Law Claims 'Wrong,' AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 10, 2008, available at http://www.the
australian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23350257-12377,00.html.
100. Gartrell, supra note 99; Cf. U.N. DRIP, supra note 56. Article 27 promotes
substantive and procedural due process principles in the recognition and adjudication
of the rights of Indigenous Peoples to their interests. Article 27 seeks recognition of
Indigenous rights and inclusion of Indigenous Peoples in an adjudicative process re-
lating to Indigenous interests. More specifically, Article 27 promotes legal pluralism
and democratic ideals by calling for "due recognition to Indigenous Peoples' laws" in
the case of adjudications of Indigenous interests. In addition, Article 34 provides:
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their
institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions,
procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or
customs, [emphasis added] in accordance with international human rights
standards.
101. Cf. Angelique EagleWoman (Wambdi A. WasteWin), Fencing Off the Eagle
and the Condor, Border Politics, and Indigenous Peoples, 23 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T. 33 (2008), available at http://www.law.uidaho.edu/documents/Eaglewoman-
NRE_Fal08.pdf?pid=109041&doc=1 (commenting that "[a]dvocates of indigenous
peoples' rights were not surprised that the United States opposed the adoption of the
first minimum human rights standards set forth in the international arena for indige-
nous peoples").
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digenous resources and intangible assets have adopted a materializa-
tion of rights framework.
By materializing rights, new rights are seen as impinging on rights
that currently exist and are retained by others. Sovereign counter-
mobilization seems to reject the notion that many rights for which In-
digenous Peoples assert by virtue of the right to self-determination are
rights that are flexible and would not impinge on the asserted rights of
others. Moreover sovereign counter-mobilization has the effect of
perpetuating cultural apartheid; stalling the implementation of widely
held standards of international human rights into national laws and
policies; and denying the relevance and vitality of Indigenous law and
its role in providing complete protection for Indigenous resources and
intangible assets.
A. Cultural Apartheid
Imperialism, colonialism, and apartheid nearly obliterated genera-
tions of Indigenous Peoples around the globe. The specter of the po-
lice state in some cases or the deprivation of rights to practice
traditional education, society, and culture in other cases eradicated
from existence large segments of peoples and populations. A general
comparison to these rights deprivations under apartheid regimes can
be made to the rights deprivations suffered by Indigenous Peoples at
the hands of dominant settler societies. Stripping Indigenous Peoples
from their lands, their culture, and their families has had a measurable
and deleterious effect on modern Indigenous communities, econo-
mies, and identity.
There is really no question that dominant settler societies caused
and continue to cause Indigenous land loss and alienation. There is
also no credible question that land loss and alienation result in de-
monstrable harm to Indigenous identity. What is becoming gravely
apparent in an information and intellectual property driven economy
is that the harm to Indigenous identity has been exacerbated by domi-
nant settler societies' intrusion upon, misappropriation of, and aliena-
tion and disenfranchisement of Indigenous Peoples from their
resources and intangible assets.
The byproduct of systemic exploitation, misappropriation, and
alienation reasonably can be characterized as economic, socio-politi-
cal, and cultural apartheid. This form of apartheid threatens to extin-
guish Indigenous identity and survival by thwarting rights-based
advocacy for Indigenous self-determination, community sustainability,
and social entrepreneurism. Stated another way, Indigenous identity
and survival in today's economy depends upon Indigenous control
over Indigenous resources and intangible assets.' °2 In order to dimin-
102. See Valerie J. Phillips, Indigenous Rights to Traditional Knowledge and Cul-
tural Expressions: Implementing the Millennium Development Goals, 3 INERCUL-
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ish the negative effects of cultural apartheid, the international com-
munity, States, Indigenous Peoples, and private corporate institutions
should learn from the ameliorative past.
One of the initiatives employed during the dismantling of apartheid
in South Africa was the establishment of The Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission ("TRC"). One of the purposes of the TRC was to
begin a healing process. Part of the process encouraged granting am-
nesty to perpetrators while simultaneously attempting to offer a pro-
cess of healing for victims. In order to make progress toward healing,
the TRC required implementing certain steps: identification of
problems, victims willing to come forward and discuss painful memo-
ries, and perpetrators willing to provide full disclosure of all requested
information.
To ameliorate the effects of cultural apartheid, similar steps can be
implemented to respond to the harms caused to Indigenous identity
by dominant settler societies' misuse and disrespect for Indigenous re-
sources and intangible assets. First, the problem must be identified.
The first step of the process has largely been accomplished by the over
twenty years of Indigenous rights-based advocacy for recognition and
protection of Indigenous resources and intangible assets. The second
step of the process is also reflected in the extensive reporting by Indig-
enous Peoples of the abuses, incursions, and infringements engaged in
by dominant settler societies. That leaves step three, the requirement
for perpetrators to provide full disclosure of their conduct resulting in
misappropriation, infringement, and misuses of Indigenous resources
and intangible assets. How this last step is accomplished depends, in
large measure, on the capacity and willingness of the international
community, States, and Indigenous Peoples to negotiate Indigenous
resource and intangible asset protections into national law.
TURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 191, 193-94 (2008) (explaining, in the context of meeting
the national millennium goals, that "national and international efforts... are likely to
concentrate on the mainstream development model, in which the lands and resources
of indigenous peoples are appropriated and/or destroyed such that the latter are
plunged deeper into poverty. International actors such as the World Bank Group
(WBG), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) have been precisely the organizations that have promoted the
mainstream development model to the exclusion of indigenous peoples' own eco-
nomic and development paradigms .... [Western] intellectual property law exclu-
sively supports the mainstream or dominant development model. . . . Scholars,
activists, and even WIPO consultants have continually pointed out that indigenous
and tribal peoples already have their own customary laws and rules which relate to
the protection and sharing of cultural property. Logically, such laws and rules are as
tied to indigenous economies as western intellectual property law is tied to the econo-
mies of nation-states. Indigenous economies are necessarily undermined when their
laws and rules regarding TCEs and genetic resources are simply ignored.").
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B. The Rights Gap: The Chasm Between International Human
Rights Standards and National Law
For Indigenous Peoples, misappropriation of Indigenous resources
and intangible assets is not only a taking for commerce without con-
science it is a taking of Indigenous resources and intangible assets for
uses inconsistent with Indigenous customs, standards and values. Ac-
cordingly, takings for commercial gain are not the only concerns for
an Indigenous system of laws and enforcement mechanisms for the
protection of Indigenous resources and intangible assets. As such,
western intellectual property rights regimes are inadequate to protect
the non-commercial attributes of Indigenous resources and intangible
assets; in contrast, international human rights standards calling for the
recognition and implementation of Indigenous law and legal systems
responds to the unique character and nature of Indigenous resources
and intangible assets. Why? Because the character and nature of In-
digenous resources and intangible assets transcend purely commercial
attributes and, as such, can be described as the crucial kernel encoded
with the knowledge, tradition, and expression that will contribute to
the survival of Indigenous identity and culture.
There has not been a wave of national reaction to and support of
implementing the aspirational goals of Articles 34 and 38 of U.N.
DRIP - for States to take appropriate measures, in consultation and
cooperation with Indigenous Peoples, to promote Indigenous struc-
tures and juridical systems that will protect and enforce Indigenous
resources and intangible assets. Failing to implement Indigenous law
and legal systems to protect Indigenous resources will only exacerbate
the currently ongoing plundering of these resources. Such a stance
will render Indigenous rights insecure; as well, such a stance will re-
flect poorly on "democratic nations"' 3 and will continue to fuel
claims of misappropriation that will ultimately require settlement at
some future date and at a greater cost to all interested parties.' °4
Judge Posner's observations about the benefits of private ownership of
physical property rights to western society are instructive. While sig-
nificant differences exist between physical property and intellectual
property, Judge Posner explains about the former that:
103. See Huff, supra note 12, at 295-296 ("State opposition to indigenous claims of
self-determination cannot be maintained if this new branch of international law [in-
cluding recent international human rights jurisprudence, international legal norms
prohibiting racial discrimination, and the U.N. DRIP] is developed, strengthened and
heeded.").
104. See id. at 295 (It is more likely that States oppose indigenous claims of self-
determination because recognizing such claims could lead to a loss of control over the
valuable natural resources which remain on indigenous traditional lands. Unilateral
State control of indigenous lands and resources is, however, already contrary to inter-
national human rights law and can no longer be lawfully maintained. States would do
better to move into a new era of relations with indigenous peoples, rather than con-
tinue to expropriate lands and resources which have never belonged to them ... ").
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with private property, people have an incentive to invest in develop-
ing the property - to make it as valuable as it can be made - be-
cause they get to enjoy the benefits of that investment. They reap
where they have sown. If you had a situation in which anyone was
free to come along and harvest the crops that you had planted, you
would not have any incentive to plant. If we want peolle to invest
for the future, we have to give them property rights.'
0a
Recognizing an analogue of rights for Indigenous resources and intan-
gible assets protected by Indigenous laws and customs for the benefit
of Indigenous Peoples facilitates Indigenous investment and develop-
ment of resources while simultaneously protecting Indigenous Peoples
from pervasive and systemic misappropriation.
Notwithstanding glacial movement to recognize and employ Indige-
nous law and legal systems to protect and enforce Indigenous re-
sources and intangible assets, a few jurisdictions have leaped ahead of
the international human rights community to develop intellectual
property-type protection for Indigenous resources. Their objective is
to protect these resources under a new rights-based regime in favor of
Indigenous Peoples, albeit most are part of national legislation and
not a codification of Indigenous law and legal systems. 10 6 For example,
Peru,' °7 Panama,1 °8 Portugal, 09 Ecuador, 110 Costa Rica,"1 and The
105. Richard A. Posner, Do We Have Too Many Intellectual Property Rights?, 9
MARO. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 173, 176-77 (2005) (Judge Posner clearly articulates
that the above reasoning does not apply equally to intellectual property because of its
invisibility, the greater potential for monopoly, the public-good aspects of intellectual
property, and greater degree of unincentivized creation of intellectual property. Nev-
ertheless, Posner recognizes that property rights have a role to play, one of which is
discerning the identity of the rights holder or steward of the intellectual property, or
as discussed in this article, the Indigenous resource.).
106. See Paul Kuruk, The Role of Customary Law Under Sui Generis Frameworks
of Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge, 17 IND. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 67 (2007) (describing Ecuadorian law on Intellectual Property of
1998 as requiring protection for biological and genetic heritage equivalent to the pro-
tection for industrial property. "The 1998 Law also conditions the grant of product or
process patents that relate to such heritage on the legal acquisition of elements of the
heritage from the relevant traditional owners."). Matthias Leistner explains that the
likely impetus for this early wave of regulation to protect traditional knowledge was
the adoption of national laws consistent with the adoption of the Convention on Bi-
odiversity. See also Matthias Leistner, Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous Re-
sources, in INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE 92-93 (Silke von Lewinski
ed.) (Kluwer Law Int'l, 2004).
107. See Leistner, Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous Resources in INDIGE-
NOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADI-
TIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE supra note 106, at 93 n.204 (citing Law
Establishing a Regime of Protection of the Collective Knowledge of the Indigenous
Peoples Related to Biological Resources, Ley No. 27811, published in the Official
Journal of Peru, El Peruano, 10 August 2002). The law, described as one of the most
elaborate laws concerning traditional knowledge, is oriented to biodiversity and re-
quires authorization be given in accordance with Indigenous Peoples' own rules and
customary law, as determined by an organization representative of the Indigenous
Peoples. Ley que Establece el Rdgimen . . . [Protection Regime for the Collective
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Philippines' 12 have enacted legislation and/or promulgated regulations
for, inter alia, the positive protection of Indigenous resources to create
incentives to maintain and continuously develop and evolve Indige-
nous resources and intangible assets for the benefit of Indigenous
Peoples and their communities.!
1 3
Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Derived from Biological Resources] Ley No.
27811, del 24 de julio de 2002, El Pervano, del 10 de agosto. The law prescribes rights
in traditional knowledge within the public domain as well as traditional knowledge
possessed by Indigenous Peoples and not yet present in the public domain. The law
also established minimum standards for licensing traditional knowledge, with particu-
lar emphasis on royalty payment schemes. Finally, the law establishes systems of reg-
isters, three in total, one of which is "established by Indigenous Peoples themselves in
accordance with their own customary law."
108. See Leistner, supra note 107, at 97 n.219 (citing to Law No. 20 of 26 June 2000,
with accompanying regulations, "The Special Intellectual Property Regime upon Col-
lective Rights of Indigenous Communities, for the Protection of their Cultural Identi-
ties and Traditional Knowledge."). The law provides for both positive protection in
favor of Indigenous Peoples and negative protection against non-authorized third
party users of cultural assets. The law paints a broad stroke that includes a mul-
tifaceted list of protected traditional knowledge and cultural expression. The law also
provides for registration and licensing.
109. See id. at 98 n.230 (citing Decree Law No. 118/2002, of 20 April 2002). This
law establishes protection for landraces (plant varieties) and has as its objectives "re-
gistration, conservation, legal custody and transfer of plant endogenous material with
an actual or potential value for agriculture, agro-forestry, and landscape-related activ-
ities," . . . as well as associated traditional knowledge, which includes "knowledge
relating to methods, processes, products, and denominations that are applicable in
agriculture, food, and industrial activities in general, including handicrafts, trade and
services informally associated with the use and preservation of local varieties, and
other endogenous and spontaneous material [] covered by the [ law." See id. at 98-
99.
110. See ICCPR, supra note 65; see also Huff, supra note 12, at 304.
111. See Leistner, supra note 107, at 115 n.292 (citing Biodiversity Law, Law No.
7788 of the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Costa Rica). The law "provides
for biodiversity-related protection of traditional knowledge .. . ; [however the law
does not resolve] the exact nature and scope of rights, the identification of benefi-
ciaries[, nor] the regulation of the public domain .... [Instead, these issues and con-
cerns are] left to further development in [a legislatively mandated] participatory
process." See id. at 118.
112. See id. at 100 n.237 (citing Philippines Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(PIPRA), Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefore,
and for other Purposes, Republic Act No. 8371, 28 July 1997). This law is one compo-
nent of the protection of cultural integrity of the various distinct regional groups of
Indigenous Peoples and its central focus is on free and prior, informed consent of
these communities. Free and prior, informed consent is determined by each commu-
nities' customary laws and practices, "free from any external manipulation, interfer-
ence and coercion... .. " See id. at 102. "The further development and
implementation of community intellectual property rights is the task of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), an office created by the PIPRA. The
NCIP... is the primary agency responsible for formulating and implementing poli-
cies, plans and programmes to recognize, protect and promote the rights of [Indige-
nous Peoples]. The members of the NCIP are seven regionally representative
Commissioners belonging [themselves] to Indigenous communities."). Id.
113. See Leistner, supra note 107, at 93.
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Despite these examples of relatively progressive legislative and reg-
ulatory action by nation-States, many of the world's Indigenous Peo-
ples have yet to have their Indigenous law and legal systems
implemented into or even meaningfully recognized by western intel-
lectual property laws or court decisions. With respect to the Indige-
nous Peoples in the United States, particularly Native Hawaiians,
western law and courts have only sporadically referred to Indigenous
laws for guidance.114 In Hawai'i, Indigenous customary law has been
recognized in a compelling line of quasi-environmental, 1 5 gather-
ing,116 and access"17 rights cases; but Indigenous law and the above
referenced cases have yet to be given weight or deference in the intel-
lectual property rights arena.
Relatively recently, the United States District for the District of
Hawai'i was presented with a case ripe for, at the very least, recogni-
tion of Indigenous rights and law in defense of a Native Hawaiian
artist being sued for copyright infringement by a non-Native Hawaiian
copyright holder."' The facts in Kim Taylor Reece v. Island Treasures
Act Gallery, Inc."9 embody many of the injustices visited upon Native
Hawaiians by colonization and assimilationist practices of the domi-
nant settler society. While the Reece decision seeks to respond to va-
rious inequities, it overlooks an opportunity to acknowledge
jurisprudence recognizing Native Hawaiian rights that are vital to pro-
tecting Native Hawaiian resources and intangible assets.
120
114. See id. at 90 (stating "[T]he United States has not formally recognized custom-
ary law as part of the general national legal system, although provision is made for its
application where necessary by Indian tribal courts.").
115. See generally Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. County Planning
Comm'n., 903 P.2d 1246, 1256-58 (Haw. 1995) (affirming decision that state agency
has an obligation to comply with the Coastal Zone Management Act [citation omit-
ted] and article XII, § 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution (read in conjunction with
[Hawai'i Revised Statutes] HRS § 1-1) in protecting traditional and customary prac-
tices of Native Hawaiians).
116. See generally Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745, 748 (Haw. 1982) (ex-
plaining Hawai'i's 1978 statute, HRS § 7-1, appears to contain two types of rights:
specific and enumerated gathering rights and general and broad access and water
rights).
117. See generally Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247, 1271 (Haw. 1992) (resolv-
ing in the affirmative, on remand in Pele Def. Fund v. Estate of James Campbell, Civ.
No. 89-089, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (August 26, 2002), the
issue of whether Native Hawaiians exercised traditional and customary subsistence,
cultural, and religious rights in undeveloped areas of Wao Kele '0 Puna as against
private landowners).
118. Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1199 (D.
Hawai'i 2006).
119. Id. This case is important because it marks a pivotal point in the extension of
western copyright protection at the expense of protection of cultural resources and
the recognition and adherence to Indigenous customary law.
120. To be fair, the procedural posture of Reece presents a couple of challenges.
First, this case was brought to a United States District Court on a theory of copyright
infringement, an exclusive federal claim. Second, Reece, a non-Native Hawaiian, was
the plaintiff in the suit and his purpose was not to protect Native Hawaiian traditional
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Notably absent from the Reece decision is any allusion to Hawai'i
precedent recognizing "Hawai'i's constitutional mandate to protect
traditional and customary [N]ative Hawaiian rights. ' 121 In the juris-
prudence addressing Native Hawaiian traditional and customary
rights - from the landmark decisions of Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Com-
pany Limited122 through Ka Pa'akai o Ka'aina v. Land Use Commis-
sion - the Supreme Court of Hawai'i has determined that:
In order for the rights of [N]ative Hawaiians to be meaningfully pre-
served and protected, they must be enforceable. In order for
[N]ative Hawaiian rights to be enforceable, an appropriate analytic
framework for enforcement is needed. Such an analytic framework
must endeavor to accommodate the competing interests of protect-
ing [N]ative Hawaiian culture and rights, on the one hand, and eco-
nomic development and security, on the other.
123
Before setting forth the analytic framework that the Reece court could
have at least considered in dicta, it is critical to first examine the Su-
preme Court of Hawai'i jurisprudence that provides the foundation
for the analytic framework that may offer guidance in future cases
where the resource rights of Indigenous Peoples are implicated.
In his landmark decision that squarely articulated the legal and eq-
uitable foundations for the recognition and protection of Native Ha-
waiian traditional and customary rights, as well as adherence to Native
Hawaiian law, custom, and usage, Chief Justice William S. Richard-
son, the first Native Hawaiian to be appointed to the Hawai'i judici-
ary, embraced legal pluralism by acknowledging and giving effect to
Indigenous law as well as western property law to deliver a transform-
ative opinion firmly establishing "the court's obligation to preserve
and customary rights; instead, his interest was to protect his copyright to a photograph
of an image, not the image itself. The conundrum in this case is that the image, a hula
dancer performing a traditional hula kahiko dance pose, is reasonably considered part
of the cultural expression of Native Hawaiians. Accordingly, Judge Seabright, the
author of the Reece opinion, may have been constrained by the posture of the case.
Notwithstanding, it is quite possible that Judge Seabright could have stopped short of
committing the hula kahiko movement and image to the public domain by proposing
in dicta that the public domain condition for using the hula kahiko would be a re-
quirement to recognize the rights and protections of Native Hawaiians in their Indige-
nous resources and intangible assets. For example, even under a western intellectual
property rights regime, Judge Seabright's ruling could have questioned whether, in
fact, Reece sought and received authority to use the hula kahiko image, by way of
license obtained from a Native Hawaiian organization, such as a halau, to permit the
type of commercial exploitation that Reece had benefited from for over twenty years.
Cf. Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
model's identity was not protected by copyright law and the state law protecting her
rights was not preempted).
121. Ka Pa'akai o Ka'aina v. Land Use Comm'n., 7 P.3d 1068, 1082 (Haw. 2000).
122. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745, 748 (Haw. 1982).
123. Ka Pa'akai o Ka'aina, 7 P.3d at 1082. In the context of Indigenous resources
and intangible assets, the goals of Indigenous law and western intellectual property
law can be complementary in many cases.
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and enforce [Native Hawaiian] traditional rights. 124 On behalf of a
unanimous panel of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, Chief Justice
Richardson resolutely opined:
We recognize that permitting access to private property for pur-
poses of gathering natural products may indeed conflict with the
exclusivity traditionally associated with fee simple ownership of
land. But an argument for the extinguishing of traditional rights
based simply upon the possible inconsistency of purported native
rights with our modern system of land tenure must fail.125
To prove the correctness of this position, Chief Justice Richardson
first explained the panel's reliance on the Hawai'i State Constitution,
Article XII, § 7 for both substantive and guiding policy. Section 7
provides:
The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and tra-
ditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes
and possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of [N]ative
Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, sub-
ject to the rights of the State to regulate such rights.
126
Next, Chief Justice Richardson interpreted HRS § 7-1 as intending to
recognize the gathering rights of Native Hawaiians by:
assur[ing] that lawful occupants of an ahupua'a may, for the pur-
poses of practicing [N]ative Hawaiian customs and traditions, enter
undeveloped lands, within the ahupua'a to gather [ items enumer-
ated in the statute. 27
Finally, Chief Justice Richardson acknowledged the enforceability
of Native Hawaiian customary law and usage by interpreting the ex-
ception to the adoption of the doctrine of custom codified in HRS § 1-
1 sanctioning the continuation of native understandings and practices
that did not unreasonably interfere with the spirit of the common
law. 128 Chief Justice Richardson explained that HRS § 1-1 "would ap-
ply in a particular area 129 [or discipline] ... as a vehicle for the contin-
ued existence of those customary rights [that] continued to be
practiced and [ ] worked no actual harm upon the recognized interests
124. See Kalipi, 656 P.2d at 748 (providing the source of Chief Justice Richardson's
core principle, which was later restated in Public Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i
County Planning Comm'n., 903 P.2d 1246, 1273 (Haw. 1995)).
125. Kalipi, 656 P.2d at 748.
126. Id.; Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247, 1271 (Haw. 1992).
127. Kalipi, 656 P.2d at 749.
128. Id. at 750-51 (explaining "that the statutory exception to the common law is
... akin to the English doctrine of custom whereby practices and privileges, unique to
particular districts[,J continued to apply to residents of those districts even though in
contravention of the common law," citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries.); see also
Pub. Access Shoreline, 903 P.2d at 1268-69 (holding "that common law rights ordina-
rily associated with tenancy do not limit customary rights existing under the laws of
this State").
129. Kalipi, 656 P.2d at 751.
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of others."13 With respect to the interests of others, Chief Justice
Richardson explained "that the retention of a Hawaiian tradition
should in each case be determined by balancing the respective inter-
ests and harm once it is established that the application of the custom
has continued in a particular area [or discipline]."' 1
Building on the landmark analytic framework penned by Chief Jus-
tice Richardson, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i extended what has
now come to be known as Kalipi rights to cover "all rights customarily
and traditionally held by ancient Hawaiians."' 32 Accordingly, the
court held that Native Hawaiian rights protected by article XII, § 7
may extend beyond the ahupua'a in which a Native Hawaiian resides
where such rights have been customarily and traditionally exercised in
this manner.'
'1 33
Continuing to build on foundations of Kalipi and Pele, the court in
Public Access Shoreline v. City Planning Commission (PASH) deter-
mined that neither of the above cases "precluded further inquiry con-
cerning the extent that traditional practices have endured under the
laws of the State; such that the nature and scope of rights retained by
§ 1-1 would [ ] depend upon the particular circumstances of each
case."'134 The opinion in PASH also explained that the rights claimed
by Native Hawaiians were not based on land ownership but rather on
a "range of practices associated with the ancient way of life which
required the utilization of the undeveloped property of others."' 35
The PASH panel further determined that "[w]here these practices
have, without harm to anyone, been continued, we are of the opinion
that the reference to Hawaiian usage in § 1-1 insures their continu-
ance for so long as no actual harm is done.... "136 The analytic frame-
work led the court to admit that "[c]ustomary and traditional rights in
[the Hawaiian Islands] flow from [N]ative Hawaiians' pre-existing
sovereignty ... [and these rights] must be protected to the extent fea-
sible in accordance with article XII, § 7.
' 137
To fulfill its obligation to provide guidance about and enforcement
of Native Hawaiian rights, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, in Ka
130. Id. at 752.
131. Id. at 751.
132. Pele Def. Fund, 837 P.2d at 1271. (At the 1978 Constitutional Convention, "the
Committee on Hawaiian Affairs added what is now known as article XII, § 7 to reaf-
firm customarily and traditionally exercised rights of [N]ative Hawaiians .... The
committee contemplated that some traditional rights might extend beyond the
ahupua'a;.... The committee intended this provision to protect the broadest possible
spectrum of [N]ative Hawaiian rights: ... [and] in reaffirming these rights in the Con-
stitution [the] committee intended the courts to provide judicial guidance and en-
forcement to guarantee these rights.").
133. Id. at 1272.
134. Public Access Shoreline, 903 P.2d at 1259.
135. Id. at 1261.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1270-72.
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Pa'akai o Ka'Aina v. Land Use Commission, articulated an analytic
framework for state agencies to apply when meeting their duty to
"protect customary and traditional [N]ative Hawaiian rights." '138 This
framework is appropriately adaptable to cases involving Indigenous
resources and intangible assets and their recognition and protection,
exclusive of or contemporaneous with analysis and application of
western intellectual property laws. The adapted analytic framework
would require a court to do the following: (1) make findings about the
identity and scope of valued Indigenous resources and intangible as-
sets that are culturally significant to Native Hawaiians; (2) make find-
ings about the extent to which traditional and customary resources
will be impaired or affected by another's conduct; and (3) draw con-
clusions about the feasible actions to be taken to reasonably protect
Native Hawaiian rights and resources. With this framework in place,
reviewing courts will not inadvertently fail to assess or consider the
impact that judicial decisions will have on the recognition and protec-
tion of Indigenous resources and intangible assets. It is this frame-
work that could have provided a more meaningful analysis of the
copyright infringement dispute launched by a non-Native Hawaiian
copyright holder against a Native Hawaiian artist who herself was
raised and trained in the cultural art of hula, a traditional dance that,
in part, communicates the identity of Native Hawaiians.
While the above cases were borne out of Native Hawaiian rights
associated with land, by virtue of the Hawai'i Constitution's article
XII, § 7, HRS § 1-1, judicial precedent and, most recently, the adop-
tion of the U.N. DRIP, they now represent strong persuasive author-
ity critically relevant to recognizing and protecting rights in
Indigenous resources and intangible assets. It is against this jurispru-
dential backdrop that the Reece case could have at least considered
the proposed adapted analytic framework. 139 Instead, the Reece case
138. Ka Pa'akai o Ka'aina, 7 P.3d at 1084 (instructing that "[i]n order to fulfill its
duty to preserve and protect customary and traditional [N]ative Hawaiian rights to
the extent feasible, the [Land Use Commission], in its review of a petition for reclas-
sification of district boundaries, must - at a minimum - make specific findings and
conclusions as to the following: (1) the identity and scope of 'valued cultural, histori-
cal, or natural resources' in the petition area, including the extent to which traditional
and customary [NIative Hawaiian rights are exercised in the petition area; (2) the
extent to which those resources - including traditional and customary [N]ative Hawai-
ian rights - will be affected or impaired by the proposed action; and (3) the feasible
action, if any, to be taken by the [Land Use Commission] to reasonably protect
[N]ative Hawaiian rights if they are found to exist.").
139. There is no doubt that the Copyright Act has application in certain contexts
involving Indigenous cultural expression. In fact, some Indigenous artists, having ac-
cess to monetary and information resources, are taking advantage of western intellec-
tual property law to protect their art and cultural creations. However, the use of
western intellectual property law to protect the varied forms of Indigenous resources
and intangible assets has been routinely criticized. This is so because Indigenous cul-
tural expression is not merely an individual effort at expression; instead, Indigenous
cultural expression is informed by and is infused with traditional knowledge and prac-
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demonstrates that the pendulum of privilege continues to shift in the
direction of western intellectual property law, the force and effect of
which is to primarily protect the interests of institutional copyright
holders and individual creators over and above the interests of Indige-
nous Peoples. 140 What is most disturbing about the Reece decision is
the language and narrative employed to arrive at its conclusion; well
meaning yes, but still disturbing.
The Reece case provides a very good example of why legal pluralism
should be recognized as a foundation for indigenizing western intellec-
tual property law's rights regime.14' Unfortunately, the Reece court
relied exclusively on western intellectual property law to reach the
short-term result it deemed equitable. This well-meaning attempt at
applying western intellectual property law alone to protect Indigenous
intangible resources can have equally harmful, albeit unintended, re-
sults. The Reece case marks a shift from the standard cases of misap-
propriation that Indigenous Peoples face. Instead of the plaintiffs
being members of the Indigenous community, the complainant was
actually a non-Indigenous person who developed a lucrative and prof-
itable business model based upon the dissemination of cultural
images, specifically the hula kahiko, captured in photographs.
142
Reece, a fine art photographer, makes a substantial living from his
sepia tone images of Indigenous-looking women posing in or perform-
ing the hula kahiko with an ocean backdrop. The subject matter of
Reece's instant lawsuit was a photograph entitled "Makanani.'
' 43
Reece first published Makanani in 1988 as a poster and since then has
licensed the image for use in myriad media, to include publication on
greeting cards, t-shirts, and picture frame inserts.' 44 In its fact-finding,
the court stated:
Plaintiff's "Makanani" photograph has been widely disseminated.
From 1995-2003, the image was used as an insert in koa picture
frames sold at Hawai'i Longs, Walmart, and Kmart stores. The pho-
tograph has been published in several magazines and newspapers in
tices that have cultural, religious, and spiritual meaning, all of which require unique
forms of additional protection. Complete and appropriate protection would be made
possible by accessing Indigenous law and relying on principles of legal pluralism to
provide essential Indigenous protection for Indigenous resources and intangible
assets.
140. One of the purposes of the Copyright Act in feudal as well as modern times
was to protect all forms of expression so as to counteract any attempts at artistic or
cultural repression. While the original granting of copyright was reserved for the priv-
ileged, it later evolved to encompass the expression of the masses. Modern develop-
ments in intellectual property law have resulted in a remarkable pendulum shift back
to securing protection primarily for privileged institutional copyright holders.
141. See Reece, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (denying Reece's motion for preliminary
injunction).
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Hawai'i. Further, plaintiff approximates that 10,000 posters and
20,000 greeting cards bearing the image have been sold.
145
Reece filed his lawsuit in 2006 after demanding that Island
Treasures Art Gallery and its owner Gail Allen cease using an "unau-
thorized copy of his photograph., 146 The alleged "unauthorized use"
to which Reece referred focused on a stained glass work created by a
Native Hawaiian artist, which was on display at the Island Treasures
Art Gallery and offered for sale by the gallery and its owner. Marylee
Colucci, the Native Hawaiian artist, created "Nohe" to depict hula
kahiko.147 The exploitative paradigm is obvious. The hula kahiko is a
form of cultural expression communicating identity, which makes it a
subject of great appreciation and significance to Native Hawaiians and
non-Native Hawaiians. Specifically, the court relies on an anthropo-
logical observation to explain that:
Hula is a vital expression of Hawaiian culture. For many, it is an
articulation of nature and beauty, of respect for the ancient gods
and goddesses, of historical memory and legends and of daily life.
Hula plays a role in preserving Hawaiian culture and history. Al-
though Hawaiian was not originally a written language, Native
Hawaiians have "an extensive literature accumulated in memory,
added to from generation to generation, and handed down by word
of mouth." Historically "[i]t consisted of meles (songs) of various
kinds, genealogies, and honorific chants, stories and traditional lore
in which were imbedded fragments of history and biography," and
which were "used as an accompaniment to the hula, a large part of
it being composed especially for that purpose. 148
Ironically and sadly, the art gallery initially removed "Nohe" from
display in response to Reece's protestations. Later, the art gallery's
owner and Colucci agreed only to display "Nohe" but not to offer it
for sale. 14 9 Reece filed his copyright infringement suit arguing
"'Nohe' is a virtually identical copy of 'Makanani"' and urging that
his "business of selling and creating original photographs will be irrep-
arably harmed" if "Nohe" continues to be displayed and sold. 5°
145. See generally id. It is important to note how fast precedent can become en-
trenched in the western common law system. Already, two cases, Art Attacks Ink,
LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 2007 WL 935655 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (Slip Copy) and
Bryant v. Gordon, 483 F.Supp.2d 605 (N.D. Ill. 2007), have cited the Reece case for
western propositions dealing directly with materials that must be considered public
domain. Lest we act swiftly to bring Indigenous context to this case, it will cement the
concept of Native Hawaiian traditional knowledge and cultural expressions as just
another element of the public domain, available for unrestricted use by all others.
146. See Reece, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
147. Id. at 1201.
148. Id. at 1200 (quoting 1 RALPH S. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 10-
11 (1938)).
149. See id. at 1201.
150. See id.
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The Reece case presents equally as many ironies as it does chal-
lenges. The decision provides a short-term equitable result-namely
the denial of the motion for preliminary injunction in favor of Colucci
and the art gallery that displayed her work; as well, the decision does
reference descriptions of Indigenous knowledge and custom, albeit for
the purpose of comparing Colucci's work to Reece's in order to assess
the former's similarity to the latter's work, consistent with application
of western intellectual property substantive rules for determining
whether illicit "copying" occurred. But the court stopped short of
truly achieving equity when it did not consider, at least in dicta, Native
Hawaiian values and rights consistent with those identified and pro-
tected by Kalipi jurisprudence. This failure works an unintended in-
justice to Native Hawaiian rights. The injustice is the failure to
recognize Native Hawaiian rights in the jurisprudential narrative to
bring some context and coherence to the actual dispute before the
court. By ignoring the Native Hawaiian rights narrative, the court in-
advertently and ironically invokes harmful narratives that can be used
against Native Hawaiians and other Indigenous Peoples attempting to
protect their Indigenous resources and intangible assets.
The first and probably most harmful injustice is the court's unilat-
eral donation of Native Hawaiian resources and intangible assets to
the public domain. Native Hawaiians did not challenge Reece's pho-
tograph as an invasion of Native Hawaiian interests in the cultural
practice and expression of hula. In fact, the Native Hawaiian commu-
nity tolerated Reece's use of culturally significant expression. Despite
this tolerance, Reece felt emboldened by western intellectual property
law to sue, among others, a Native Hawaiian artist for her expression
of her cultural identity. In responding to the dispute before it, the
court invoked only federal copyright law; it overlooked the primacy of
the Native Hawaiian right to use traditional practices in sanctioned
cultural expression. At the same time, the court, when assessing the
copyrightability of Reece's photograph, unilaterally laid claim to the
practice of hula kahiko by defining the practice as an "idea... forever
the common property of mankind." '151 The irony is clear. Upon ap-
plying federal copyright law without regard to addressing any other
framework, the court determined Reece's photograph to be copyright-
able and deserving of at least thin copyright protection while simulta-
neously and unilaterally deciding that the practice of hula kahiko is
"unprotectable" and thus "owned" by the public domain, not Native
Hawaiians. The following excerpt from the case further crystallizes the
transfer of Native Hawaiian rights in hula kahiko to the public
domain:
Not all elements of plaintiff's photograph are copyrightable. Copy-
right protection does not extend to the idea underlying the work;
151. See id. at 1202.
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only the expression of the idea by the artist is protected. Some gen-
eral ideas are not protected by copyright law; instead, 'they remain
forever the common property of artistic mankind.' Further, every-
one is free to use materials in the public domain, and no one can
obtain the exclusive right to them by incorporating them in a liter-
ary, musical, or artistic work.152
The district court's determination that several elements of hula
kahiko amount to ideas or facts under a western paradigm results in a
dual misappropriation of Native Hawaiian resources and intangible
assets. In two virtually consecutive transactions, Native Hawaiian
traditional resources and intangible assets were misappropriated: first
with the filing of a copyright infringement action by a non-Indigenous
individual and second by the unilateral judicial decision to transfer
ownership of aspects of the hula kahiko to the public domain.
The public domain debacle is not the only irony of the case. With
the application of federal copyright law's access and substantial simi-
larity test, the court gives more weight to Reece's commercially profit-
able distribution right than to Colucci's right to engage in cultural
expression. This is borne out by the limited result in the case. While
Colucci's "Nohe" cultural expression was deemed not similar to
Reece's work, the court specifically stated that "[it] wishes to make
clear, however, that its ruling is limited in nature and applies only to
this piece of art, "Nohe." What this means is that other cultural ex-
pressions depicting hula kahiko could violate Reece's work. Accord-
ingly, Reece has, de facto, monopolized more rights than he ever
deserved. To illustrate this conclusion, the art gallery owner testified
"it relies on a regular supply of art from local artists and approxi-
mately five percent of consignments are artworks featuring hula danc-
ers[; ... because of Reece's lawsuit,] artists have stopped producing
artworks with hula images for the gallery and some have removed
their [other] works from the gallery." '153 This is a clear example of
how protecting Indigenous resources and intangible assets would ben-
efit both Indigenous Peoples and non-Indigenous Peoples, alike. Both
groups of artists could have felt safe to continue engaging in creative
and cultural expressions; but now both groups fear litigation if they
produce works similar to any of Reece's works, which primarily center
on hula images.
Another likely unintended result from the case is that in order for
Colucci and the art gallery to defend successfully against liability for
copyright infringement, they had to agree that the 'ike motion of the
hula kahiko was itself unprotected. The result is a judicial record that
transforms an element of Native Hawaiian cultural expression and
traditional practice into a commodity available for indiscriminate use
by others with no consideration for the rights of Native Hawaiians.
152. See id. at 1202-03.
153. See Reece, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
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As such, Native Hawaiians are dispossessed and disenfranchised of
their right either to direct the appropriate use of the practice or to
regulate how others would portray a component of Native Hawaiian
identity for commercial or other purposes. The practical result of the
court's decision is the granting of a license to allow others (corpora-
tions, non-Native artists, tourists, etc.) to freely distribute, monopo-
lize, and profit from their external perceptions of the cultural images
significant and meaningful to Native Hawaiians.
There is another disturbing aspect to the case, which relates to re-
framing the Native Hawaiian narrative. Again, while likely unin-
tended, the language and reasoning used in the opinion rewrites the
narrative presented by Colucci, a Native Hawaiian artist. First, even
though Colucci explained the derivation of her cultural expression,
the court imposed its law regarding "copying" and gave marginal
weight to the derivation of "Nohe." Colucci explained the origin of
"Nohe":
["Nohe" was drawn] from her own memories as a hula dancer, from
memories and photographs of her niece ("Nohe's" namesake) danc-
ing hula and from pictures of other hula performances. She said she
has created other stained glass works of hula dancers on the beach
and that the dancers are always faceless, with similar skin and hair
color and with a lei or flower in their hair. Colucci explained that
she includes 'ilima in her dancers' lei because the flower is her
halau's signature.
1 54
Colucci explained further that she omits facial features in an effort to
represent all Hawaiian hula dancers, not just a single dancer. Despite
Colucci's explanation of the faceless feature, the court when compar-
ing the two works reinterprets Colucci's cultural expression in the fol-
lowing way: "The dancer's blank face makes her anonymous, whereas
the model in Makanani is clearly a specific person.... 155 Colucci
was, in essence, communicating to the court about the collective iden-
tity of Native Hawaiians. This very fine point about narrative exem-
plifies what is really present in Colucci's cultural expression and what
is absent from Reece's work. The court could have identified this as-
pect of Native Hawaiian culture and practice to distinguish Colucci's
work from Reece's work when analyzing "copying" in accordance
with federal copyright law.
While the Reece court's decision-making power was to a degree lim-
ited by the procedural posture of this case, there were opportunities
for the court to consider the adapted analytic framework when ren-
dering its decision. First, either through dicta or the recognition of
prior rights in the hula kahiko image, the district court could have
made findings about the valid owner of the cultural image that was the
154. See id. at 1201.
155. See id. at 1209.
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subject matter of Reece's photograph. Next, the district court could
have considered whether Native Hawaiian rights in Indigenous re-
sources and intangible assets would have been impaired by the unilat-
eral transfer of hula kahiko to the public domain. Finally, the district
court could have fashioned a more elegant injunction that would have
comprehensively responded to what Reece was taking from both Na-
tive Hawaiians and non-Native Hawaiians by the threat of litigation
for future cultural and creative expressions. For these reasons, the
Reece decision should be viewed by Native Hawaiians and the Hawai'i
judiciary as a clarion-call to implement the U.N. DRIP into state law
as well as extend Kalipi rights to Native Hawaiian resources and in-
tangible assets at the earliest opportunity.
V. INDIGENOUS LAW, LEGAL PLURALISM, AND
RE(DE)FINING THE NARRATIVE
Customary law is much broader than the general legal system. It is
dynamic; an expression of tradition and a means of expressing the
rules that allow communities to operate effectively.'56 Mistakenly, the
narrative associated with customary law is that it is rigid, inflexible,
and even ancient.157 Such characterizations are the foundations for
156. Kathryn Trees, Contemporary Issues Facing Customary Law and the General
Legal System: Roebourne - A Case Study, in ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAWS: PRO-
JECr 94 BACKGROUND PAPERS 214, 215 available at http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/
2publications/reports/ACL/BP/BP-06.pdf; John Toohey, Aboriginal Customary Laws
Reference - An Overview, in ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAWS: PROJECT 94 BACK-
GROUND PAPERS 173, 176 available at http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/2publications/
reports/ACL/BP/BP-05.pdf; Chris Cunneen and Melanie Scwartz, Customary Law,
Human Rights and International Law: Some Conceptual Issues, in ABORIGINAL CUS-
TOMARY LAWS: PROJECT 94 BACKGROUND PAPERS 429, 431 available at http://www.
Irc.justice.wa.gov.au/2publications/reports/ACL/BP/BP-11.pdf; Megan Davis and
Hannah McGlade, International Human Rights Law and the Recognition of Aborigi-
nal Customary Law, in ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAWS: PROJECT 94 BACKGROUND
PAPERS 382, 387 available at http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/2publications/reports/
ACL/BP/BP-10.pdf; Greg McIntyre, Aboriginal Customary Law: Can It Be Recog-
nized?, in ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAWS: PROJECT 94 BACKGROUND PAPERS 342,
345 available at http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/2publications/reports/ACL/BP/BP-09.
pdf; Terri Janke and Robynne Quiggin, Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property
and Customary Law, in ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAWS: PROJECT 94 BACKGROUND
PAPERS 452, 452 available at http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/2publications/reports/
ACL/BP/BP-12.pdf; Steven Churches, Aboriginal Customary Law in the Context of
Western Australian Constitutional Law, in ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAWS: PROJECT
94 BACKGROUND PAPERS 534, 537 available at http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/2
publications/reports/ACL/BP/BP-14.pdf; and Victoria Williams, The Approach of
Australian Courts to Aboriginal Customary Law in the Areas of Criminal, Civil, and
Family Law, in ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAWS: PROJECT 94 BACKGROUND PAPERS
(2006) available at http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/2publications/reports/ACL/BP/BP-
01.pdf.
157. There is no doubt that there exists an air of immutability about Indigenous
customary law but this in no way should be used to render the conclusion that Indige-
nous customary law is inflexible, static, and ancient. The Honorable John Toohey
cites Professor Max Charlesworth's critique: "but one must distinguish between the
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criticisms about Indigenous customary law's place in settling contro-
versies about rights and obligations relating to knowledge, resources,
and intangible assets owing their origins, in whole or in part, to Indig-
enous Peoples. These criticisms question Indigenous law's legitimacy
in modern society. A few of the more prevalent criticisms question:
Indigenous law's transparency, predictability, coherence, and consis-
tency; the existence and reliability of customary institutions and sys-
tems; and the risks associated with elevating special interests above
the majority.15 8 The most insidious criticism, however, is steeped in
the self-promoting argument that Indigenous law has been misused to
advance the egoistic interests of the communities' most powerful
members. 1
59
These are compelling arguments that shine suspicion on Indigenous
law and legal systems, but these arguments are equally cogent when
repositioned to reflect the shining light of scrutiny on any other legal
system past or present. Despite this truism, it is worth responding to
these criticisms in order to make way for the equally compelling argu-
ments to support the implementation of Indigenous law and legal sys-
tems to recognize and protect Indigenous resources and intangible
assets.
The first criticism would reject acknowledging Indigenous law and
legal systems on grounds that they would not be transparent, predict-
able, determinate, coherent, and consistent. Understanding the posi-
tioning of this argument is key to recognizing the fallacy of what this
argument would posit. Indigenous law would be applied to Indige-
nous resources and intangible assets, not to intellectual property that
squarely exists by virtue of creation in the non-Indigenous world.
Thus, if Indigenous Peoples govern Indigenous resources and intangi-
ble assets and they choose to acknowledge Indigenous law and legal
systems, this does not have to be measured against what proponents
of the western intellectual property rights regime would consider
transparent, predictable, determinate, coherent, and consistent. As an
ancillary matter, it is quite interesting that the intellectual property
rights lobby is largely directed by corporate institutional actors who
drive intellectual property rights policy to suit their vision of extensive
ownership and control of technology, media, pharmaceuticals, and any
public rhetoric of Aborigines, which gives the impression that Aboriginal religion is
essentially devoted to the faithful replication of the primordial design laid down by
Ancestor Spirits, and the reality of actual life and practice where there is continual
profess of development and creative invention." Toohey, supra note 156, at 174, 187.
158. See Peter Orebech, The Place of Customary Law in Democratic Societies, in
THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 41, at
290 (framing these criticisms in more general terms).
159. See Fred Bosselman, The Choice of Customary Law, in THE ROLE OF CUS-
TOMARY LAW IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 41, at 439 (reporting that
"some observers of customary law systems have noted conflicts between the sexes or
among age groups").
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other valuable intangible asset to the exclusion of those unable to pay
monopoly prices.
The next criticism would reject acknowledging Indigenous law and
legal systems for their perceived lack of reliability. Indigenous law
and legal systems rely on Indigenous Peoples being willing to assent to
the law. Because customary law is contractual in nature, its existence
depends on popular acknowledgement by Indigenous Peoples. To this
end, Indigenous law and legal systems will remain reliable so long as
they are acknowledged by Indigenous Peoples. Relying on Indige-
nous Peoples' acknowledgement is also what will keep Indigenous law
and legal systems from becoming static and intractable. In order for
Indigenous law and legal systems to remain vital to Indigenous com-
munities, both urban and rural, Indigenous law and legal systems will
have to continue to evolve with Indigenous circumstances. Thus, the
reliability of Indigenous law and legal systems will be maintained by
establishing mechanisms for redefining or abolishing out-of-date cus-
toms, practices, and laws.
160
Still, more objection to acknowledging Indigenous law and legal
systems derives from the argument that such law is undemocratic in
that it would elevate the interests of Indigenous Peoples and their law
above the majority. Putting aside the colonization histories of Indige-
nous Peoples who were themselves displaced by the undemocratic ap-
plication of the laws of the dominant settler society, this argument
fails again for want of proof that recognizing Indigenous law for the
protection of Indigenous resources and intangible assets would disen-
franchise a powerful and disproportionately well-represented domi-
nant settler society. Such arguments are fiction; their goals are meant
to entrench the status quo in which the dominant settler society re-
tains its laws that depend for their existence on the primacy of repre-
sentative democracy as opposed to a true democracy where even
"societal members of lower status or position initiate and contribute
to custom.
1 6 1
Finally, the most insidious argument for rejecting Indigenous law
and legal systems is ironically that acknowledgement would mean cer-
tain members of Indigenous groups wielding power over other com-
munity members or even excluding the latter from Indigenous
community participation. The irony in this criticism is barely palat-
able. Issues of domination, control, and marginalization plague any
legal system. Such a criticism assumes that Indigenous Peoples do not
maintain a framework of rights recognition within their own laws.
This criticism can be responded to in many ways, but it seems most
effective to remind the dominant settler majority that customary law
represents the "living fabric of [Indigenous] life," which has been
160. See 0rebech, supra note 41, at 298-99.
161. Id. at 295.
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under attack since first contact. The struggle of Indigenous Peoples to
obtain rights recognition as against dominant settler societies is a his-
tory that teaches of the inequities and injustices that result from domi-
nation, control, and marginalization. Indigenous Peoples no longer
tolerate this treatment from dominant settler societies and, therefore,
it is unlikely that they will tolerate it within Indigenous communities.
There are strong and compelling arguments for acknowledging In-
digenous law and legal systems, especially with respect to recognizing
and protecting Indigenous resources and intangible assets. As a fun-
damental matter, all laws potentially impacting the rights in and inter-
ests to Indigenous resources and intangible assets should aim to
achieve comprehensive protection. Thus, it would be unethical, inac-
curate, and even incompetent for proponents of a unitary western le-
gal system to ignore Indigenous law, procedural protocols, or
community rules that govern Indigenous resource and intangible as-
sets. 162 Ignoring the suitability of Indigenous law and legal systems to
protect Indigenous resources and intangible assets would result in di-
minishing the value of the asset and potentially depleting the asset to
a point where there would be no value for any group or individual.
Despite the above criticisms, Indigenous law shares significant dem-
ocratically rooted ideals with western common law and with the theo-
retical, idealistic principles that democratic legislation is normatively
meant to achieve. For example, Aboriginal customary law has a body
of rules, values, and traditions accepted in Indigenous societies as es-
tablishing standards and procedures to be followed and upheld. 163 In
addition, acknowledging Indigenous law and legal systems will em-
power Indigenous Peoples and reinforce the responsibility that ac-
companies law-making and law-enforcing power.
Looking inward, proponents of Indigenous law and legal systems
argue that protection of Indigenous knowledge should originate at the
grassroots level as an initiative of the Indigenous or local communities
with the active support of their national governments.'64 This inward
162. See generally Silke von Lewinski, Protection of Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore by Legal Regimes beyond Intellectual Property, in INDIGE-
NOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADI-
TIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, supra note 106, at 386-96; see Meghana
RaoRane, Aiming Straight: The Use of Indigenous Customary Law to Protect Tradi-
tional Cultural Expressions, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 827, 846 (2006) (concentrating
mainly on the application of Indigenous customary law to protect Indigenous cultural
expression, RaoRane argues that Indigenous customary law has satisfactorily gov-
erned the use of TCEs, and is flexible enough to protect the diverse cultural expres-
sions of Indigenous communities around the world).
163. Sarah Pritchard, The Significance of International Law, in INDIGENOUS PEO-
PLES, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 14 (citing K.
Maddock, Aboriginal Customary Law, in ABORIGINES AND THE LAW: ESSAYS IN
MEMORY OF ELISABETH EGGLESTON 212, 230-32 (Peter Hanks and Bryan Keon-Co-
hen eds., 1984)).
164. See Oguamanam, supra note 56, at 201.
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approach is in line with a bottom-up or upstream model of extra-legal
lawmaking that redistributes law equally among members of soci-
ety.165 The upstream approach makes possible the adaptation of In-
digenous law to Indigenous-related rights and obligations. The
approach allows Indigenous law and legal systems to be flexible, to
respond to the modern conditions of Indigenous Peoples, and to facili-
tate the evolution of "the living fabric of [Indigenous] life."
166
Acknowledging that Indigenous law is real law and that it serves as
the foundation for Indigenous legal systems will also promote cooper-
ation and innovation inside and outside of Indigenous communities.
In many cases, Indigenous law represented and continues to represent
the original common law of certain lands. Indigenous law systems
have or are capable of implementing governing bodies, representa-
tives, constitutions, and Acts of Law. Most important, Indigenous law
and legal systems are legitimate because Indigenous Peoples, as well
as non-Indigenous Peoples, continue to acknowledge and assent to In-
digenous law through ongoing adherence to rules, practices, or cere-
monial processes and accompanying sanctions. 167 By acknowledging
Indigenous law and legal systems, the dominant settler society will
find that Indigenous Peoples might be more willing to cooperate with
non-Indigenous Peoples because there will be built a level of trust,
acceptance (without assimilation), and a willingness to innovate along-
side non-Indigenous Peoples to evolve knowledge systems of both In-
digenous and non-Indigenous Peoples.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is significant ground to cover in order to reach a truly demo-
cratic society where Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples are
treated equally. The United Nations Declaration for the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples is one small step toward this equality. More steps
need to be taken to ensure the protection of Indigenous Peoples and
their resources and intangible assets. Many legal and political think-
ers, from the late Darrell Posey to Ian Hugh Kawharu and Maui Solo-
165. See 0rebech, supra note 41, at 282-83 (comparing top-down and bottom-up
democracy to assess the benefits of customary law. 0rebech concludes "top-down
proponents often overlook the disadvantageous aspects of the parliamentary decision-
making process. Although the executive branch may be indirectly democratic, heavy
lobbying and overly expensive delegation of enforcement power create opportunities
for 'groupthink,' '[g]roup polarization,' and corporate strongholds[J,]" ultimately lead-
ing to deviations from legislative intent or even corruption. The end result is that
"[t]he ruling power is not the 'pluralistic channel will,' but the will of bureaucracy and
strong corporate powers" - a far cry from "ideal democracy.").
166. See id. at 283 (presenting the normative case for recognizing the legitimacy of
customary law premised upon bottom-up democracy as opposed to a faulty bureau-
cratic system - a disabled legislative body - that has crippled democracy by abrogat-
ing true representation of the will of the people).
167. See id. at 282.
256 TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
mon, 168 are aware that Indigenous resources and intangible assets
represent one of the most significant modern rights issues for Indige-
nous Peoples both internationally and domestically. Implementation
of the U.N. DRIP and the recognition of Indigenous law and legal
systems are two vital tools to refind Indigenous rights for the survival
of Indigenous identity in a constantly evolving, globalizing, and re-
source hungry society.
168. See Introduction, in WAITANGI REVISITED: PERSPECTIVES ON THE TREATY OF
WAITANGI, supra note 6, at xviii.
